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Abstract
Entry into force of the UN Watercourses Convention in August 2014, and the opening 
of the UNECE Water Convention to all states in March 2016, are significant milestones 
in international water law. A comparative analysis of these two global water conven-
tions and the 1995 Mekong Agreement shows that all three instruments are generally 
compatible. Nonetheless, the international legal principles and processes set forth in 
the two conventions can render the Mekong Agreement more up to date, robust and 
practical. Strengthening the Agreement would be timely, given the increasing pres-
sures associated with the rapid hydropower development within the basin and the 
gradually emerging disputes therein. Because of these fast-moving developments, 
the monograph strongly recommends that the Mekong states seriously consider 
joining both conventions in order to buttress and clarify key provisions of the 1995 
Mekong Agreement.
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 Introduction
The Mekong River and its many tributaries flow through six countries (China, 
Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam). Seventy million people are 
reliant upon the river to sustain their livelihoods.1 In order to foster cooperation 
between the states of the Mekong Basin, the Agreement on the Cooperation for 
the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin (Mekong Agreement) 
was adopted in 1995.2 At the time of its adoption, the Mekong Agreement was 
heralded as epitomizing a flexible agreement that could effectively govern 
the Mekong River Basin in an equitable and sustainable manner.3 This aspira-
tion was reinforced by the establishment of the Mekong River Commission 
(MRC), which, as envisaged within the Mekong Agreement, offered an inter-
governmental platform to further develop cooperation amongst the states of 
the Mekong River Basin.4 Twenty years on from its adoption, the ability of the 
Mekong Agreement and the MRC to make effective and collective decisions 
pertaining to major infrastructure developments within the basin, and hydro-
power in particular, has been called into question.5
Entry into force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non- 
navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UN Watercourses Convention)6 
in August 2014 constituted a fundamental milestone in the development of the 
1   S. Pech & K. Sunada, ‘Population Growth and Natural-Resources Pressures in the Mekong River 
Basin’, 37:3, AMBIO (2008) 219–224.
2   Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin 
(1995).
3   G.E Radosevic & D.C. Olson, ‘Existing and Emerging Basin Arrangements in Asia: Mekong 
River Commission Case Study’, paper presented at World Bank, Third Workshop on River 
Basin Institution Development, 24 June 1999, Washington, D.C.
4   Chapter IV, Mekong Agreement.
5   E.B. Backer, ‘The Mekong River Commission: Does It Work, and How Does the Mekong Basin’s 
Geography Influence Its Effectiveness?’ 26(4) Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 
(2007) 32–56; R.K. Paisley, P. Weiler & T. Henshaw ‘Trans-boundary Waters Governance 
Through The Prism of the Mekong River Basin’, in J. Gray, C. Holley & R. Rayfuse, (eds), Trans-
jurisdictional Water Law and Governance (London: Routledge 2016) 43–61; C. Sneddon and 
C. Fox ‘Rethinking Transboundary Waters: Critical Hydropolitics of the Mekong Basin’, 25 
Political Geography (2006) 181–202; P. Hirsch, et al., National Interests and Trans-boundary 
Water Governance in the Mekong (Sydney: Mekong Resource Centre 2006); O. Hensengerth, 
‘Trans-boundary River Cooperation and the Regional Public Good: The Case of the Mekong 
River’, 31 Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International Strategic Affairs (2009), 
326–49; B. Bearden, ‘The Legal Regime of the Mekong River: A Look Back and Some Proposals 
for the Way Ahead’, 12 Water Policy (2010) 798–821.
6   Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997), 
UN Doc. A/Res/51/229.
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law relating to international watercourses.7 The significance of entry into force 
of the UN Watercourses Convention was heightened in the Mekong region due 
to the fact that it was Vietnam, a party to the Mekong Agreement, that was 
the 35th country to become a party to the UN Watercourses Convention. As 
the 35th party to join the UN Watercourses Convention, Vietnam triggered the 
Convention’s entry into force.8 The UN Watercourses Convention, adopted in 
1997, is considered to be, in most parts, a reflection of customary international 
law.9 As a global framework convention, the UN Watercourses Convention’s 
primary function is to provide a flexible legal framework in which watercourse-
specific agreements can be developed, interpreted and implemented.
In parallel to the progressive number of states joining the UN Watercourses 
Convention, the UN Economic Commission for Europe’s Convention on the 
Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes 
(UNECE Water Convention)10 which was adopted under the auspices of 
the UNECE—a pan-European inter-governmental economic institution— 
underwent a process of amendment in order to allow states outside the 
UNECE region to become party to it. The decision to amend the UNECE Water 
Convention was made in November 2003 at the Third Meeting of the Parties, 
held in Madrid, Spain,11 and the amendment eventually came into effect in 
March 2016.12 Now any state can join the UNECE Water Convention, including 
states of the Mekong River Basin.
In light of calls to reform and strengthen the Mekong governance regime, it 
is pertinent to consider what the two conventions now operating at the global 
level, either individually or collectively, might offer. Can the similarities and 
differences between the two global water conventions be capitalised upon in 
order to help strengthen the existing Mekong Agreement in order to provide 
7    ‘UN Watercourses Convention Enters into Force’, http://www.unwaercoursesconvention 
.org/news/united-nations-watercourses-convention-enters-into-force (accessed 23 Novem-
ber 2016).
8    Article 36 of the UN Watercourses Convention provides that, ‘[t]he present Convention 
shall enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the thirty-fifth 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations.’
9    S. McCaffrey, ‘The Contribution of the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses’ 1(3/4) International Journal of Global Environmental 
Issues (2001) 250–263.
10   Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International 
Lakes (1992).
11   UNECE, Amendment to articles 25 and 26 of the Convention, 12 January 2004, UN Doc. 
ECE/MP.WAT/14.
12   UNECE, https://www.unece.org/env/water.html (accessed 5 December 2016).
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a more complete legal framework for the Mekong River Basin? This mono-
graph seeks to tackle this timely question. In so doing, the monograph begins 
by outlining the global legal architecture for transboundary watercourses and 
discussing the global significance of the UN Watercourses Convention’s entry 
into force and the opening up of the UNECE Water Convention. An overview 
of the objective and normative content of both conventions is then offered, 
before a detailed investigation of the compatibility of the three instruments. 
Finally, recommendations are made for strengthening the governance of the 
legal regime of the Mekong River Basin. These recommendations indicate 
that the benefit of Mekong riparian states joining both the UN Watercourses 
Convention and the UNECE Water Convention would be considerable for the 
people who live in the region and rely on its resources.
A  Evolution, Overview and Status of the UN Watercourses 
Convention, the UNECE Water Convention and the Mekong 
Agreement
I The UN Watercourses Convention
(a) Evolution and Status
Agreements governing international watercourses can be traced back as far 
as 2,500 BC, yet this field of law largely gathered pace in the second half of 
the 20th century.13 Much work needs to be done to strengthen arrangements 
pertaining to the world’s international watercourses. Watercourse agreements 
are generally bilateral in nature and are largely developed, signed and ratified 
by those countries whose borders are adjacent to, or encompass, the interna-
tional watercourse in question.14 Only approximately 40 percent of the world’s 
263 international watercourses are now covered by a basin-specific agreement, 
which suggests that a significant number of basins are reliant upon customary 
international law.15 The need to strengthen governance arrangements pertain-
ing to transboundary waters has been recognised by some UN agencies with a 
mandate related to water. They observed that:
13   S.C. McCaffrey, ‘The Evolution of the Law of International Watercourses’, 5(2) Austrian 
Journal of Public and International Law (1996) 87–111.
14   N. Zawahri & S. McLaughlin, ‘Fragmented Governance in International Rivers: Negotiating 
Bilateral Versus Multilateral Treaties’, 44 International Studies Quarterly (2011) 835–858.
15   UN-Water, ‘Transboundary Waters: Sharing Benefits, Sharing Responsibilities’, UN-Water 
Thematic Paper, 2008, http://www.unwater.org/downloads/UNW_TRANSBOUNDARY 
.pdf (accessed 24 November 2016), at 6.
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. . . existing agreements are sometimes not sufficiently effective to pro-
mote integrated water resources management due to problems at the 
national and local levels such as inadequate water management struc-
tures and weak capacity in countries to implement the agreements as well 
as shortcomings in the agreements themselves (for example, inadequate 
integration of aspects such as the environment, the lack of enforcement 
mechanisms, limited—sectoral—scope and non-inclusion of important 
riparian states).16
The need to strengthen governance arrangements pertaining to the world’s 
international watercourses was already highlighted by the UN in the latter half 
of the 20th century. The UN began exploring legal problems relating to interna-
tional watercourses following adoption of a UN General Assembly Resolution 
in 1959.17 This initial resolution, which called for the UN Secretary General to 
take up a study of the legal problems relating to international rivers, was duly 
carried out and completed in 1963.18 A supplementary report was produced by 
the UN Secretary-General in 1974.19 Both reports surveyed existing state prac-
tice relating to international rivers as a precursor by which general rules and 
principles on the subject could be formulated. Based on the preliminary report 
by the UN Secretary-General, the UN General Assembly took the decision to 
recommend that the International Law Commission (ILC) take up the study 
of the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses, ‘with a 
view to its progressive development and codification.’20
The ILC worked on the topic of the law of the non-navigational uses of 
international watercourses from 1971 to 1994.21 This work involved an extensive 
16   Ibid., at 6. See also, UNEP, GEF & UNEP-DHI Centre on Water and Environment, Trans-
boundary River Basins—Status and Trends (Nairobi: UNEP, 2016), at 110.
17   UN General Assembly Resolution 1401(XIV), Preliminary Studies on the Legal Problems 
Relating to the Utilisation and Use of International Rivers, 21 November 1959, UN Doc. 
A/RES/1401(XIV).
18   UN Secretary-General, Legal Problems Relating to the Utilisation of International Rivers’, 
UN Doc. A/5409.
19   UN Secretary-General, Legal Problems Relating to the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses—Supplementary Report by the Secretary-General, 25 March 
1974, UN Doc. A/CN.4/274.
20   UN General Assembly Resolution 2669 (XXV), Progressive Development and Codification 
of the Rules of International Law Relating to International Watercourses, 8 December 
1970, UN Doc. A/RES/2669(XXV).
21   S.C. McCaffrey, ‘An Assessment of the Work of the International Law Commission’, 36 
Natural Resources Journal (1996) 297–318.
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exercise in surveying state practice and consulting with states through the UN 
General Assembly, as well as surveys and questionnaires, in order to develop 
a set of draft articles that would be acceptable to all states.22 The task was for-
midable: to reach a globally agreed-upon set of baseline legal principles and 
processes for governing transboundary rivers between two or more states. Key 
areas of disagreements, particularly between upstream and downstream states, 
related to: the definition of an international watercourse; the treatment of 
existing agreements; the relationship between equitable and reasonable utili-
sation, and no significant harm; the extent of the obligation to notify of planned 
measures; and the compulsory nature of dispute settlement mechanism.23 The 
complexity of negotiations and difficulties in reaching consensus on these 
matters explains the length of time the ILC took to adopt a final set of draft 
articles. However, a testament to the quality of the ILC’s work on the topic was 
reflected in the decision that the General Assembly took in 1994 to use the 
draft articles as a basis by which to, ‘elaborate a framework convention on 
the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourse.’24
The negotiation of the UN Watercourses Convention took place within the 
sixth committee of the UN General Assembly from 7 to 25 October 1996 and 
24 March to 4 April 1997. The areas where it proved difficult to research con-
sensus during the work of the ILC resurfaced during the negotiations within 
the sixth committee of the UN General Assembly.25 However, states were 
able to reach a conclusion of the work on 21 May 1997, when the UN 
22   See for example, ILC, Replies of Governments to the Commission’s Questionnaire, 1 April 
1976, UN Doc. A/CN.4/294 & Add. 1; ILC, Replies of Governments to the Commission’s 
Questionnaire, 13 July 1979, UN. Doc. A/CN.4/324; ILC, Replies of Governments to the 
Commission’s Questionnaire, 10 March & 3 July 1980, UN Doc. A/CN.4/329 & Add.1; ILC, 
Replies of Governments to the Commission’s Questionnaire, 18 February & 28 June 
1982, UN Doc. A/CN.4/352 & Add. 1; ILC, Comments and Observations Received from 
Governments, 3 March, 15 April, 18 May and 14 June 1993, UN Doc. A/CN.4/447 & Add. 1–3.
23   See E. Schroeder-Wildberg, ‘The 1997 International Watercourses Convention—Back-
ground and Negotiations’, Working Paper on Management in Environmental Planning, 
2002,  https://www.landschaftsoekonomie.tu-berlin.de/fileadmin/a0731/uploads/ 
publikationen/workingpapers/wp00402.pdf (accessed 24 November 2016).
24   UN General Assembly Resolution 49/52, Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses, 9 December 1994, UN Doc. A/Res/49/52.
25   See A. Rieu-Clarke, ‘Determining Sovereign Rights and Duties over International 
Watercourses: The Contribution of the International Law Commission and the UN 
General Assembly’, in T. Tvedt, O. McIntyre & T.K. Woldetsadik, (eds), A History of Water—
Sovereignty and International Water Law (London: I.B. Tauris 2015) 149–174.
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Watercourses Convention was adopted.26 At the time of its adoption, the UN 
 Watercourses Convention was sponsored by 28 states, including Cambodia, 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Vietnam.27 A vote was also taken on the 
adoption of the convention, with 103 states voting in favour (including Cam-
bodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Thailand and Vietnam), three states 
voting against (including China) and 26 states abstaining.28
Given this overwhelming support for the UN Watercourses Convention 
within the UN General Assembly, it might be questioned why it took until 2014 for 
the instrument to enter into force. Several reasons have been put forward 
for this lengthy period. Salman points to a number of contentious issues and mis-
understandings concerning the content of the UN Watercourses Convention.29 
Other suggested reasons include treaty congestion, lack of awareness of the 
Convention and capacity to consider the benefits of ratification within govern-
ment departments, and a lack of champions promoting the Convention.30 In 
2006, the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) and its partners embarked on a 
concerted effort to address the reasons that were slowing down ratification of 
the Convention.31 Through a suite of training and awareness-raising activities, 
this resulted in the Convention’s entry into force in 2014. Activities to further 
promote the Convention have continued since its entry into force.32 These 
activities include a meeting of parties to the UN Watercourses Convention, 
regional and international organisations and others, which took place at UN 
Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) headquarters in 
Paris on 15 and 16 September 2016.33
26   UN General Assembly Resolution 51/229, Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses, 8 July 1997, UN Doc. A/Res/51/229.
27   UN General Assembly Official Records, 51st Session, 99th Plenary Meeting, 21 May 1997, 
UN Doc. A/51/PV.99.
28   Ibid.
29   S.M.A. Salman, ‘The United Nations Watercourses Convention Ten Years Later: Why Has 
its Entry into Force Proven Difficult?’, 32 Water International (2007) 1–15.
30   A. Rieu-Clarke & F.R. Loures, ‘Still Not in Force: Should States Support the 1997 UN 
Watercourses Convention? 18(2) Review of European, Comparative & International 
Environmental Law (2009) 185–197.
31   See WWF, Water Conventions, http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/how_we_work/policy/
conventions/water_conventions (accessed 24 November 2016).
32   See activities listed infra note 111.
33   UNESCO, ‘Historic Gathering of the Parties to the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention 
at UNESCO’, 15 September 2015, http://en.unesco.org/news/historic-gathering-parties-
1997-watercourses-convention-unesco (accessed 24 November 2016).
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(b) Overview
The overarching objective of the UN Watercourses Convention is to, ‘ensure 
the utilisation, development, conservation, management and protection of 
international watercourses and the promotion of the optimal and sustainable 
utilisation thereof for present and future generations.’34 While the need for 
a global framework instrument was recognised by states,35 there was consid-
erable debate over the appropriate scope of the Convention.36 Ultimately, a 
compromise was sought whereby the Convention applies to the, ‘uses of inter-
national watercourses and of their waters for purposes other than navigation 
and to measures of protection, preservation and management related to the 
uses of those watercourses and their waters.’37 The use of the term ‘water-
course’ was preferred over the term ‘drainage basin’,38 given that some states 
were concerned that the latter term would, ‘leave open the possibility of undue 
and unacceptable restrictions which would affect not only the watercourse 
in question but also all those which constitute it, as well as those in the geo-
graphical areas through which they pass.’39 The term ‘watercourse’ is defined 
in the Convention as meaning, ‘a system of surface waters and groundwaters 
constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and com-
monly flowing into a common terminus’;40 and an ‘international watercourse’ 
as meaning, ‘a watercourse, parts of which are situated in different states.’41 
This definition of a watercourse therefore embraces the interconnectivity 
of the system of waters that flow between states, while avoiding the ‘basin’ 
34   Preamble, UN Watercourses Convention.
35   Comments and Observations Received from Governments, supra note 22. Canada, for ex-
ample, suggested that, ‘a framework of residual rules . . . would be legally binding when 
watercourse States do not otherwise agree on a governing regime’, supra note 22, at 149.
36   Rieu-Clarke, supra note 25, at 153–155.
37   Article 1 (1), UN Watercourses Convention.
38   The term ‘drainage basin’ had appeared in the International Law Association’s, Helsinki 
Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers (Helsinki), which defined them as 
being, ‘a geographical area extending over two or more states determined by the water-
shed limits of the system of waters, including surface and underground waters, flowing 
into a common terminus’, see Helsinki Rules, in S. Bogdanović, International Law of Water 
Resources (London: Kluwer Law International 2001), 99–145, at 100.
39   Replies of Governments to the Commission’s Questionnaire, UN Doc. A/CN.4/294 & 
Add. 1, supra note 22, at 162.
40   Article 2(a), UN Watercourses Convention. Given that Article 2(a) solely defines a ‘water-
course’ as being the water itself, it might be seen as slightly at odds with Article 1(1), of the 
UN Watercourses Convention, which refers to ‘watercourses and . . . their waters.’
41   Article 2(b), UN Watercourses Convention.
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terminology that some states resisted. In addition, it can be argued that the 
protection, preservation and management of international watercourses, 
the key objective of the UN Watercourses Convention, would not be possible 
without taking into account both land- and water-related activities within 
a basin.
A drainage basin approach is also reflected in the main substantive norms 
of the UN Watercourses Convention. The overarching substantive require-
ment is that, ‘Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an 
international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner.’42 In deter-
mining how to utilise an international watercourse in an equitable and reason-
able manner, states are required to take into account all relevant factors and 
circumstances.43 The Watercourses Convention does not stipulate the weight 
that should be given to different uses, but rather provides that, ‘no use of an 
international watercourse enjoys inherent priority over other uses’, and ‘spe-
cial regard’ should be afforded to, ‘the requirements of vital human needs.’44
A further qualification on the equitable and reasonable utilisation princi-
ple is set out in Article 7, which provides that, ‘Watercourse States shall, in 
utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate 
measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourses 
States.’45 Such a requirement is, however, aligned to the principle of equitable 
and reasonable utilisation in that, where significant harm is caused to another 
watercourse state, it will only be considered unlawful if it is also deemed to 
be contrary to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation.46 While 
some writers have argued that this approach may favour socio-economic uses 
of international watercourses over those that are potentially harmful to the 
environment,47 it should be remembered that the UN Watercourses Convention 
also stresses the importance of protecting the environment of international 
42   Article 5(1), UN Watercourses Convention.
43   Art. 6, UN Watercourses Convention.
44   Art. 10, UN Watercourses Convention.
45   Art. 7.
46   Art. 7(2).
47   E. Hey, ‘The Watercourses Convention: To What Extent Does it Provide a Basis for 
Regulating Uses on International Watercourses’, 7 Review of European, Comparative & 
International Environmental Law (1998) 291–300; A. Nollkaemper, ‘The Contribution of 
the International Law Commission to International Water Law: Does it Reverse the Flight 
from Substance?’, 27 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (1996) 39–73. See also 
Salman, supra note 29.
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watercourses.48 Article 20, for example, stipulates that, ‘Watercourse States 
shall, individually and, where appropriate, jointly, protect and preserve eco-
systems of international watercourses.’49 Along similar lines, Article 5 of the 
Watercourses Convention states that any determination of equitable and rea-
sonable utilisation should aim towards a sustainable utilisation of an interna-
tional watercourse,50 and watercourse states must cooperate in the protection 
of an international watercourse.51 Such emphasis on environmental needs, 
and a growing scientific understanding and recognition of the importance 
of the need to protect the environment, suggests that environmental needs 
and interests may afford similar protection as the requirement to protect vital 
human needs in the determination of what is equitable and reasonable.52
In order to support the key substantive norms, the UN Watercourses 
Convention sets out a series of procedural requirements.53 States are placed 
under an obligation to cooperate, ‘on the basis of sovereign equality, territo-
rial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain optimal utilisa-
tion and adequate protection of an international watercourse.’54 More specific 
procedural requirements are also included within the text, the most detailed 
48   See generally, O. McIntyre, Environmental Protection of International Watercourses 
under International Law (London: Ashgate Publishing Group 2007); O. McIntyre, ‘The 
Emergence of an “Ecosystem Approach” to the Protection of International Watercourses 
under International Law’, 13(1) Review of European, Comparative & International 
Environmental Law (2004), 2–14; O. McIntyre, ‘The Protection of Freshwater Ecosystems 
Revisted: Towards a Common Understanding of the “Ecosystems Approach” to the 
Protection of Transboundary Resources’, 32(1) Review of European, Comparative & 
International Environmental Law (2014) 88–95; J. Lee, Preservation of Ecosystems of 
International Watercourses and the Integration of Relevant Rules—An Interpretative 
Mechanism to Address the Fragmentation of International Law (London: Brill 2014).
49   Art. 20. See also Art. 21 (Prevention, reduction and control of pollution), Art. 22 
(Introduction of alien or new species), and Art. 23 (Protection and preservation of the 
marine environment).
50   Art. 5(1), UN Watercourses Convention.
51   Art. 5(2), UN Watercourses Convention.
52   Rieu-Clarke & Spray, ‘Ecosystems Services and International Water Law: Towards a More 
Effective Determination and Implementation of Equity?’16(2) Potscheftstroom Electronic 
Review (2013) 12–65.
53   On the importance of procedural requirements, see O. McIntyre, ‘The Proceduralisation 
and Growing Maturity of International Water Law: Case Concerning Pulp Mills on 
the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 22(3) Journal of Environmental Law (2010) 
475–497.
54   Art. 8(1), UN Watercourses Convention.
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of which relates to notification and consultation of planned measures.55 
Watercourses states are obligated to notify another state or states in a timely 
manner of any planned measures that may have a significant adverse effect 
on their uses of an international watercourse.56 Notification must be accompa-
nied by available technical data and information, including, where available, 
any environmental impact assessment that may have been conducted. The Con- 
vention goes on to set out additional detail concerning, inter alia, the time 
period for replying to a notification,57 obligations upon states during the noti-
fying period,58 and procedures to follow in the absence of notification.59
As well as procedural requirements relating to the notification of planned 
measures, the UN Watercourses Convention also sets out additional procedural 
requirements. The Convention provides an explicit requirement for states to 
cooperate in the regular exchange of data and information and in relation to 
emergency situations.60 Additional requirements to cooperate on procedural 
matters can be inferred from key provisions of the Watercourses Convention, 
such as the requirement to take ‘all appropriate measures’ to prevent significant 
harm.61 This requirement, which is considered to be a due diligence obligation, 
might require states to put in place procedural frameworks pertaining to per-
mitting and licensing, stakeholder participation, and environmental impact 
assessment.62 Many other provisions of the UN Watercourses Convention, 
whilst not stipulating the detail, require states to, ‘where appropriate, jointly’, 
conduct certain actions, including: the prevention, reduction and control of 
pollution;63 the protection and preservation of the marine environment;64 
55   Art. 11. See also Art. 5(2), which obliges watercourse states to, ‘cooperate in the protection 
and development’ of an international watercourse.
56   Art. 12, UN Watercourses Convention.
57   Art. 13, UN Watercourses Convention.
58   Art. 14, UN Watercourses Convention.
59   Art. 18, UN Watercourses Convention.
60   Art. 9 and 26 of the UN Watercourses Convention.
61   Art. 7, UN Watercourses Convention.
62   See A. Tanzi, A. Kolliopoulos & N. Nikiforova, ‘Normative Features of the UNECE Water 
Convention’, in A. Tanzi, et al. (eds), The UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use 
of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes: Its Contribution to International 
Water Cooperation (London: Brill 2015), 116–129, at 122–128; UNECE, Guide to Implementing 
the Water Convention, 2013, UN Doc. ECE/MP.WAT/39, at 10–12.
63   Art. 21, UN Watercourses Convention.
64   Art. 23, UN Watercourses Convention.
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regulation;65 and the prevention and mitigation of harmful conditions.66 Such 
cooperative efforts will more often than not be procedural in nature.
An additional mechanism envisaged in the UN Watercourses Convention 
to support the implementation of substantive norms relates to the establish-
ment of institutional arrangements. While the Convention falls short of explic-
itly requiring watercourse states to establish joint institutional arrangements, 
states are obliged to, ‘enter into consultations concerning the management of 
an international watercourse, which may include the establishment of a joint 
management mechanism.’67
Finally, a key feature of the UN Watercourses Convention is Article 33, which 
sets out a stepwise procedure by which states might settle any disputes in a 
peaceful manner. Initially, watercourse states are obliged to settle their dis-
putes by negotiation.68 Failing that, states, ‘may jointly seek the good offices 
of, or request mediation or conciliation by, a third party, or make use, as appro-
priate, of any joint watercourse institutions that may have been established 
by them or agree to submit the dispute to arbitration or to the International 
Court of Justice.’69 There is therefore considerable discretion as to the means 
by which states might choose to settle their dispute. However, if the dispute 
remains unresolved after six months, the dispute, at the request of one of the 
states, must be submitted to an impartial third-party fact-finding commission, 
which will investigate the dispute and provide a recommendation on how it 
might be resolved.70 The parties must consider the recommendation of the 
third-party fact-finding commission in good faith.71
65   Art. 25, UN Watercourses Convention.
66   Art. 27, UN Watercourses Convention.
67   Art. 24 of the UN Watercourses Convention. Art. 8 also provides that, ‘watercourse States 
may consider the establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions, as deemed neces-
sary by them, to facilitate cooperation on relevant measures and procedures in the light 
of experience gained through cooperation in existing joint mechanisms and commission 
in various regions.’
68   Art. 33(1), UN Watercourses Convention.
69   Art. 33(2), UN Watercourses Convention.
70   Art. 33(2)-(7), UN Watercourses Convention.
71   Art. 33(8).
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II The UNECE Water Convention
(a) Evolution and Status
The UNECE started working on water issues in the 1940s.72 During this initial 
phase, the UNECE’s activities related to water focused on issues of hydropower. 
For instance, UNECE played a role in the development of a bilateral agreement 
between Austria and Yugoslavia relating to the utilisation of the Drava River 
for the purposes of hydro-electric power generation.73 By the 1960s, a UNECE 
Committee on Water Problems was established. Over the course of the next 
three decades, it produced a series of recommendations, declarations and 
decisions on water matters, including long-term planning for: water manage-
ment; desalinisation; groundwater recharge; the use of economic instruments 
in water management; drinking water and sanitation; prevention and control 
of water pollution; international cooperation; waste-water treatment; and 
dam safety.74
72   A. Rieu-Clarke, ‘Remarks on the Drafting History of the Convention’ in A. Tanzi, et al. 
(eds), The UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses 
and International Lakes: Its Contribution to International Water Cooperation (London: 
Brill 2015), 3–14; Y. Berthelot and P. Rayment, ‘Looking Back and Peering Forward—A 
Short History of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe’, 1947–2007 (2007) 
UN Doc. ECE/INF/2007/4, at 33.
73   Convention between the Governments of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and 
the Federal Government of the Austrian Republic Concerning Water Economy Questions 
Relating to the Drava (1954).
74   See for example, UNECE, Declaration of Policy on Water Pollution Control, 29 April 
1966, UN Doc. E/ECE/1084; UNECE, Recommendations to ECE Governments on Long-
term Planning of Water Management, May 1976, UN Doc. ECE/ENVWA/2; UNECE, 
Recommendations to ECE Governments on Selected Water Problems in Islands and 
Coastal Areas with Special Regard to Desalination and Ground Water, December 1978, 
UN Doc. ECE/ENVWA/2; UNECE, Recommendations to ECE Governments on Rational 
Utilization of Water, December 1979, UN Doc. ECE/ENVWA/2; UNECE, Recommendations 
to ECE Governments on Economic Instruments for Rational Water Resources, December 
1980, UN Doc. ECE/ENVWA/2; UNECE, Declaration of Policy on Prevention and Control 
of Water Pollution, including Transboundary Water Pollution, 1980, UN Doc. E/ECE/
WATER/38; UNECE, Recommendations to ECE Governments on Water Pollution from 
Animal Production, December 1981, UN Doc. ECE/ENVWA/2; UNECE, Decision on 
International Co-operation on Shared Water Resources, December 1982, UN Doc. ECE/
ENVWA/2; UNECE, Recommendations to ECE Governments on Drinking Water Supply and 
Effluent Disposal System, December 1982, UN Doc. ECE/ENVWA/2; UNECE, Declaration of 
Policy on the Rational Use of Water, December 1984, UN Doc. ECE/ENVWA/2; UNECE, 
Decision on Co-operation in the Field of Transboundary Waters, December 1986, 
UN Doc. ECE/WATER/42; UNECE, Recommendations to ECE Governments on Rational 
Use of Water in Industrial Processes, December 1987, UN Doc. ECE/ENVWA/2; UNECE, 
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In 1989 it was suggested that a framework instrument be concluded amongst 
the states of the UNECE region, which would in part consolidate and give 
legally binding effect to much of the aforementioned previous work that had 
been carried out in this area.75 A meeting of the ‘Senior Advisors to UNECE 
Governments’ discussed this suggestion from 26 February to 2 March 1990.76 A 
key outcome of the meeting was a recognition of the urgency of elaborating 
a framework convention.77 Five special sessions of the UNECE Working Party 
on Water Problems took place between May 1990 and October 1991 in order to 
elaborate the text of the proposed Convention. These meetings involved rep-
resentatives from a diverse group of 25 states, as well as several international 
organisations.78 The outcome of the meetings, namely a draft Convention, was 
submitted to the fifth session of the Senior Advisors to UNECE Governments 
on Environmental and Water Problems, which was held on 20 March 1992. 
The draft Convention was subsequently adopted, and all UNECE states and 
regional economic integration organisations were encouraged to sign and rat-
ify the instrument as soon as possible to ensure its prompt entry into force.79 
The drafting and the negotiation of the UNECE Water Convention was there-
fore considerably shorter than the UN Water Convention. A major factor 
Recommendations to ECE Governments on Water-management Systems, 2 December 
1987, UN Doc. ECE/ENVWA/2; UNECE, Recommendations to ECE Governments on Waste-
water Treatment, March 1988, UN Doc. ECE/CEP/10; UNECE, Recommendations to ECE 
Governments on the Protection of Soil and Aquifers Against Non-point Source Pollution, 
March 1988, UN Doc. ECE/CEP/10; UNECE, Recommendations to ECE Governments on 
Dam Safety with Particular Emphasis on Small Dams, March 1989, UN Doc. ECE/CEP/10; 
UNECE, Charter on Ground-water Management, December 1989, UN Doc. ECE/ENVWA/12.
75   OSCE, ˈ Report on Conclusions and Recommendations of the Meeting on the Protection of 
the Environment of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europeˈ, 5 November 
1990, http://www.osce.org/eea/14075?download=true (accessed 24 November 2016).
76   UNECE, Senior Advisers to ECE Governments on Environmental and Water Problems—
Report of the Third Session, 12 March 1990, UN Doc. ECE/ENVWA/14.
77   Ibid., at 5.
78   The following governments participated: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech 
and Slovak Federal Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, 
Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Union of the Soviet Socialist 
Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America; together with the Food and 
Agricultural Organisation, the World Meteorological Organisation, the European 
Economic Community and the Danube Commission.
79   UNECE, Decision B(5) on the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes’, in Report of fifth session.
 15the governance regime of the mekong river basin
INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW 2.1 (2017) 1–84
that most likely assisted in the drafting and negotiation of the UNECE Water 
Convention was the existing work, spanning three decades, that the UNECE 
states had conducted together on matters relating to water. This groundwork 
most likely helped to settle major differences across a diverse region. After 
a relatively short period from its adoption, the UNECE Water Convention 
entered into force in 1996.80 To date, 41 states are party to the UNECE Water 
Convention.81
The UNECE Water Convention has developed significantly since its entry 
into force in 1996. Two additional protocols have been negotiated under the 
Convention, one related to ‘Water and Health’,82 and the other concerning 
‘Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the Transboundary 
Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters.’83 A series of recom-
mendations, guidance notes and other publications have also been adopted 
by the parties of the UNECE Water Convention in order to strengthen its 
implementation.84 However, the most significant development for the pur-
poses of this monograph was the decision made by the parties of the UNECE 
Water Convention in 2003 to amend the Convention in order to allow accession 
by countries outside the UNECE region.85 The amendment entered into force 
80   The UNECE Water Convention entered into force on 6 October 1996, following the 16th 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession (see Art. 26 of the UNECE 
Water Convention).
81   See UN Treaty Collection, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY& 
mtdsg_no=XXVII-5&chapter=27&clang=_en (accessed 24 November 2016).
82   Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (1999).
83   Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the Transboundary 
Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters to the 1992 Convention on the 
Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and to 
the 1992 Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents (2003).
84   See for example UNECE, Policy Guidance Note on the Benefits of Transboundary 
Water Cooperation, October 2015, UN Doc. ECE/MP.WAT/47; UNECE, Model Provisions 
on Transboundary Groundwaters, February 2014, UN Doc. ECE/MP.WAT/40; Guide 
to Implementing the Water Convention, supra note 62; UNECE, Guidance on Water 
and Adaptation to Climate Change, October 2009, UN Doc. ECE/MP.WAT/30; UNECE, 
Recommendations on Payments for Ecosystem Services in Integrated Water Resources 
Management, August 2007, UN Doc. ECE/MP.WAT/22; Good Practice in Monitoring and 
Assessment of Transboundary Rivers, Lakes and Groundwaters, December 2006, UN Doc. 
ECE/ENHS/2006/18; and Guidelines on Sustainable Flood Management, January 2000, 
UN Doc. MP.WAT/2000/7.
85   Supra note 11.
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in 2013 and became operational in March 2016.86 This opens up the  possibility 
for Mekong states, along with other countries around the world, to join the 
UNECE Water Convention.
(b) Overview
The primary objective of the UNECE Water Convention, as set out in its title 
and preamble, is the protection and use of transboundary watercourses and 
international lakes. In the operational part of the Convention, ‘transbound-
ary watercourses’ and ‘international lakes’ are conflated into the term ‘trans-
boundary waters’, which is defined as being, ‘any surface or ground waters 
which mark, cross or are located on boundaries between two or more States.’87 
Groundwater that is both connected or unconnected to surface water there-
fore falls within the scope of the UNECE Water Convention.
As a framework instrument, the UNECE Water Convention obliges states to, 
‘enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements or other arrangements, where 
these do not yet exist, or adapt existing ones, where necessary, to eliminate 
the contradictions with the basic principles of ’ the Convention.’88 What con-
stitutes ‘the basic principles’ of the UNECE Water Convention are not spelled 
out in the agreement, but the use of such a term would suggest there is consid-
erable flexibility in how existing agreements might be viewed alongside this 
framework instrument.89
The main substantive obligations of the UNECE Water Convention are set 
out in Articles 2 and 3. Article 2(1) requires parties to ‘take all appropriate 
measures to prevent, control and reduce transboundary impact.’ What con-
stitutes ‘transboundary impact’ is defined broadly to mean, ‘any significant 
86   Supra note 12.
87   Art. 1(1), UNECE Water Convention. Art. 1(1) goes on to explain that, ‘wherever trans-
boundary waters flow directly into the sea, these transboundary waters end at a straight 
line across their respective mouths between points on the low-water of their banks.’
88   Art. 9(1), UNECE Water Convention.
89   The UNECE, Guide to Implementing the Water Convention (supra note 62, at 64), sug-
gests that:
   “The reference to ‘basic principles’ should not be read in a restrictive manner, so as 
to refer only to those provisions which coincide with the recognized principles of in-
ternational environmental law. Such reference should be read in line with the ordinary 
meaning of its wording to the effect that the pre-existing water agreements between the 
Riparian parties do not contravene the fundamental provisions of the Convention itself. 
At the same time, reference to the “basic principles” of the Convention avoids the require-
ment to incorporate every single provision of the Convention in case there is a need to 
adapt existing agreements to the Convention.”
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adverse effect on the environment resulting from a change in the conditions of 
transboundary waters caused by a human activity, the physical origin of which 
is situated wholly or in part within an area under the jurisdiction of a Party, 
within an area under the jurisdiction of another Party.’90 The Article goes on to 
explain that, ‘such effects on the environment include effects on human health 
and safety, flora, fauna, soil, air, water, climate, landscape, and historical mon-
uments or other physical structures or the interaction among these factors; 
they also include effects on the cultural heritage or socio-economic conditions 
resulting from alternations to those factors.’91
While such effects might appear wide-ranging, it is important to bear in 
mind that in practice what will be required by states will depend on the nature 
and risk of any potential transboundary impact and the capacity of states to 
prevent, control and reduce such impact.92 In determining what measures 
might be appropriate, states are further guided that they: prevent, control and 
reduce pollution of waters causing or likely to cause transboundary impact; 
ensure that transboundary waters are used with the aim of ecologically sound 
and rational water management, conservation of water resources and environ-
mental protection; ensure that transboundary waters are used in a reasonable 
and equitable way, taking into particular account their transboundary charac-
ter, in the case of activities which cause or are likely to cause transboundary 
impact; ensure conservation and, where necessary, restoration of ecosystems.93 
Additionally, in taking the appropriate measures to prevent, control and reduce 
transboundary impact, states must be guided by the precautionary principle, the 
polluter-pays principle and the principle of inter-generational equity.94
The UNECE Water Convention recognises the importance of procedure in 
implementing the aforementioned substantive rights and obligations. States 
are obliged to adopt several legal, administrative, financial and technical mea-
sures to prevent, control and reduce transboundary impact.95 Such measures 
include: the use of low- and non-waste technology in the prevention, control 
and reduction of the emission of pollutants; the protection of pollution at 
source through waste-water discharges, which should be monitored and con-
trolled; placing limits on waste-water discharges based on the best available 
technology for discharges of hazardous substances; the adoption of stricter 
90   Art. 1(2), UNECE Water Convention.
91   Ibid.
92   See Tanzi et al., supra note 62.
93   Art. 2(2), UNECE Water Convention.
94   Art. 2(5), UNECE Water Convention.
95   Art. 3(1), UNECE Water Convention.
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requirements, even leading to prohibition, when the quality of the receiving 
water or the ecosystem so requires; the adoption of at least biological treat-
ment or equivalent processes for municipal waste water; the application of 
best available technology to reduce nutrient inputs from industrial and munic-
ipal sources; the development and implementation of best environmental 
practices for the reduction of inputs of nutrients and hazardous substances 
from diffuse sources; the application of environmental impact assessment 
and other means of assessment; the promotion of sustainable water-resources 
management, including the ecosystem approach; the development of contin-
gency planning; the taking of specific measures to prevent groundwater from 
pollution; and the minimization of risk of accidental pollution.96
Additional procedural requirements set out in the UNECE Water Convention 
include: requirements to enter into consultations;97 monitor the conditions 
of transboundary water;98 cooperate in the carrying out of research and 
development;99 the exchange of data and information;100 and the provision of 
public information regarding, ‘the conditions of transboundary waters, mea-
sures taken or planned to be taken to prevent, control and reduce transbound-
ary impact, and the effectiveness of those measures.’101
Implementation of the provisions of the UNECE Water Convention is 
supported through a strong emphasis on institutional arrangements. At the 
level of individual transboundary waters, states are obligated to: establish 
‘joint bodies’, which are required to carry out a range of functions, including 
the identification of pollution sources likely to cause transboundary impact, the 
elaboration of joint monitoring programmes, the development of inventories 
and exchange information on pollution sources; the elaboration of emission 
limits for wastewater; the elaboration of joint water-quality objectives and 
criteria; the development of joint action programmes for the reduction of 
pollution loads from point and diffuse pollution sources; the establishment 
of warning and alarm procedures. States must also: act as a forum for the 
exchange of information on existing and planned uses of water and related 
installations that are likely to cause transboundary impact; promote coopera-
tion and exchange of information on best available technology; and participate 
96   Art. 3(1), UNECE Water Convention.
97   Art. 10, UNECE Water Convention.
98   Arts. 4 & 11, UNECE Water Convention.
99   Arts. 5 & 12, UNECE Water Convention.
100   Arts. 6 & 13, UNECE Water Convention.
101   Art. 16, UNECE Water Convention.
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in the implementation of environmental impact assessments relating to trans-
boundary waters.102
As well as putting in place institutional arrangements at the level of spe-
cific transboundary waters, the UNECE Water Convention also provides for 
the establishment of an overarching institutional framework to support the 
implementation and development of the Convention.103 A meeting of the par-
ties is to be convened every three years in order to review the policies and 
methodologies that have been adopted to: support the implementation of the 
Convention; to exchange information on experiences gained in the implemen-
tation of the Convention; to seek services of relevant ECE bodies and other 
competent international bodies in support of the Convention; and consider 
and adopt proposals for amendments to the Convention.104 The Convention 
also establishes a secretariat, which functions include: convening and prepar-
ing meetings of the parties; transmitting reports and other information related 
to the Convention to the parties; and any other activities that the parties deem 
appropriate.105
Finally, the UNECE Water Convention provides certain dispute-settlement 
mechanisms. In the first instance, parties are obliged to seek to resolve their 
disputes by negotiation, or any other means acceptable to the parties.106 Parties 
are also encouraged, upon signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acced-
ing to the Convention, to declare in writing that for any disputes that are not 
resolved by negotiation of other means, that they accept to submit the dispute 
to compulsory dispute settlement either by the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) or arbitration.107
III Joint Promotion of Both Conventions
Given that states now have the option to join both the UN Watercourses 
Convention and the UNECE Water Convention, a concerted effort has been 
undertaken to ascertain and promote the benefits of both conventions.
Studies that have compared the two conventions have led to the conclusion 
that they are compatible with each other.108 Such a finding of compatibility 
102   Art. 9(2), UNECE Water Convention.
103   Part III, UNECE Water Convention.
104   Art. 17, UNECE Water Convention.
105   Art. 19, UNECE Water Convention.
106   Art. 22(1), UN Water Convention.
107   Art. 22(2) & Annex IV, UNECE Water Convention.
108   See for example, UNECE, The Economic Commission for Europe Water Convention 
and the United Nations Watercourses Convention—An Analysis of their Harmonized 
Contribution to International Water Law, 2015, UN Doc. ECE/MP.WAT.42.
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is consistent with the principle of harmonisation in international law, which 
stipulates that, ‘when several norms bear on a single issue they should, to the 
extent possible, be interpreted so as to give rise to a single set of compatible 
obligations.’109 This is not to say that the conventions are exactly the same. Far 
from it. While core principles are shared between the two instruments, there 
are some significant differences in the text. Where one convention provides 
a general provision on a particular matter, the other convention may go into 
more detail. Examples can be seen through the comparative analysis of the 
two conventions, and the Mekong Agreement, which will be conducted below. 
However, it is important to note here that these differences justify supporting 
the promotion of both conventions as a fuller package of legal norms relating 
to international watercourses.
The need to promote both conventions as a package has been gaining 
increasing momentum in recent years. For instance, at the 6th session of the 
Meeting of the Parties to the UNECE Water Convention, the UN Secretary-
General stated that, ‘[t]he globalisation of the UNECE Convention should 
also go hand-in-hand with the expected entry into force of the Watercourses 
Convention. These two instruments are based on the same principles. They 
complement each other and should be implemented in a coherent manner.’110 
The complementary nature of the two conventions is also reflected by the 
number of states that have become a party to both instruments, which include 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
Various activities and studies have also sought to explore how the interna-
tional community might best capitalise upon the synergies between the two 
instruments. For example, the current work programme of the UNECE Water 
Convention stipulates that:
The Meeting of the Parties will promote synergies and coordination 
with the Watercourses Convention by sharing the experience collected 
under the Water Convention to support the implementation of the 
Watercourses Convention, promoting exchanges and ordination between 
109   UN General Assembly, Report of the International Law Commission 48th Session, 2006, 
UN Doc. A/61/10, at 408.
110   UN Secretary-General, Message to Meeting of Parties to the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/ 
DAM/env/water/mop_6_Rome/Presentations/Secretary_General_message.pdf (accessed 
24 November 2012).
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the parties to the two Conventions and by offering an intergovernmen-
tal framework for discussion and provision of information on the two 
Conventions.111
Pursuant to this ambition, a range of activities have been organised in order 
to raise awareness to the two water conventions, and assess their relevance 
within specific regions and countries.112 These workshops have been comple-
mented by activities that have taken place at a global level to promote the two 
water conventions in tandem.113
Promotion of the two water conventions in tandem requires effective coor-
dination. Currently, there is only an informal arrangement in support of the UN 
Watercourses Convention, whereas the UNECE Water Convention is supported 
by the aforementioned institutional framework, which includes a Meeting of 
the Parties and Secretariat.114 As both conventions evolve and support for them 
gathers pace, it will be important to put in place effective institutional arrange-
ments that can maximise the synergies between both instruments.115
111   UNECE, Report of the Meeting of the Parties on its Seventh Session, 7 July 2016, UN Doc. 
ECE/MP.WAT/49/Add.1, at 13.
112   Such activities include workshops that have explored the relevance of the two Conventions 
within particular regions, including the Workshop on Transboundary Water Cooperation 
in Latin America and Pan European Regions, 11–12 June 2013, Buenos Aires, Argentina; the 
Workshop on General Principles of Transboundary Water Cooperation, 3–4 October 2016, 
Campeche, Mexico; a side event on International Water Law at the Sixth Africa Water 
Week, 18–22 July 2016, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; National Workshop on the UNECE Water 
Convention: Key Aspects and Opportunities for Iraq, 13–14 January 2016, Amman, Jordan; 
National Workshop on Frameworks for Transboundary Water Cooperation: Focus on 
the UNECE Water Convention, 10 March 2015, Amman, Jordan; Workshop on the UNECE 
Water Convention: Key Aspects and Opportunities for Lebanon, 4–5 February, Beirut, 
Lebanon; workshop on Legal Frameworks for Cooperation on Transboundary Waters—
Key Aspects and Opportunities for the Arab Countries, 11–12 June 2014.
113   See for example a side event on ‘The Surprising Benefits of Transboundary Water 
Cooperation’, organised at the Stockholm World Water Week, 28 August, 2016; and 
a Special Focus Session at the World Water Forum on ‘Two Global Conventions on 
Transboundary Water Cooperation: So What?’ 14 April 2015, Daegu, Republic of Korea.
114   See generally, A. Rieu-Clarke & R. Kinna, ‘Can Two Global UN Water Conventions 
Effectively Co-exist? Making the Case for a ‘Package Approach’ to Support Institutional 
Coordination’, 23(1) Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental 
Law (2014) 15–31.
115   Ibid.
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IV Evolution, Overview and Status of the Mekong Agreement
(a) Key Characteristics
The unique nature of the Mekong River Basin, its hydro-geographical fea- 
tures, the people who live there, and the resources and ecosystems upon 
which they rely has dictated the evolution of cooperation within the basin. 
Originating high within the Tibetan Plateau and making its way down through 
China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and finally Vietnam, where it forms 
the Mekong Delta and empties into the South China Sea, the Mekong River is 
a uniquely inter-connected and hydro-geographical resource.116 That the river 
flows down from approximately 5,000 metres above sea level in Tibet is a criti-
cal point to highlight, because this steepness of decline in the run of the river 
is what provides the potential for hydropower development.117 The river itself is 
4,800 kilometres long and the basin encompasses an area of 795,000 square 
kilometres, making it the 21st largest river basin in the world.118 In terms of 
approximate area per basin state: 20 percent falls inside China’s borders, three 
percent within Myanmar, 25 percent in Laos, 20 percent in Thailand, 19 per-
cent in Cambodia and eight percent within Vietnam.119 The relative position of 
each riparian along the mainstream of the River had, and still has, extremely 
crucial implications for the role of each state in the negotiation, development 
and membership of the Mekong Agreement and MRC.
In hydrological terms, the Mekong River is divided into two very distinguish-
able sub-basins: the Upper Mekong Basin, incorporating the head of the River 
and narrow upstream highland areas within China and Myanmar; and the 
Lower Mekong Basin, encompassing the lower half of the river’s length yet 
the majority—roughly three quarters—of its lowland catchment area across 
Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam.120 Notably for the purposes of this 
monograph, the dichotomy between the Upper and Lower Mekong Basins 
is often a commonly referred to delineation not only in a hydro-geographi-
cal sense, but also from a hydro-political and governance sense as the Upper 
116   MRC, State of the Basin Report 2010 (Vientiane: MRC 2010).
117   N. Van Duyen, ‘The Inadequacies of Environmental Protection Mechanisms in the 
Mekong River Basin Agreement 6 Asia Pacific Journal of Environmental Law (2001) 349–
376, at 350; ICEM, MRC Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) of Hydropower on the 
Mekong Mainstream: Summary of the Final Project (Hanoi: MRC 2010).
118   MRC, supra note 116.
119   Food and Agriculture Organisation, ‘Aquastat—Mekong River Basin’ http://www.fao.org/
nr/water/aquastat/basins/mekong/index.stm (accessed 24 November 2016).
120   B. Bearden, A. Rieu-Clarke & S. Pech, ‘Mekong Basin’, in F. Rocha Loures & A. Rieu-Clarke 
(eds.), The UN Watercourses Convention in Force—Strengthening International Law for 
Transboundary Water Management (Abingdon: Routledge 2013) 180–188, at 181.
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Mekong Basin states are not party to the Mekong Agreement nor the MRC.121 
However, one must be careful in drawing reference to these two distinct basins 
in the context of the regional legal, political and geographic landscape, as con-
flations or extrapolations on the basis of hydrological catchments can oversim-
plify or confuse matters. Moreover, there are significant contrasting elements 
between states within both sub-basins, including ‘vast differences between the 
four lower Mekong countries in terms of geography, population size and level 
of economic development.’122
Tributaries play a vital role within the Mekong River basin, more so than 
many other rivers. The entire Mekong drainage network is extremely com-
plex, with the Lower Mekong Basin alone comprising more than 100 major 
and minor tributaries, some of which are transboundary in nature.123 What is 
most critical about these tributaries is their significant yet vastly uneven con-
tribution to the flow of the Mekong River mainstream. On average, tributaries 
provide over 44 of flow to the Mekong.124 This disproportionately high volu-
metric input by tributaries into the mainstream flow regime is only matched in 
extremes by their fluctuation according to tropical monsoonal seasons. There 
is an enormous increase in flow of the Mekong from tributaries throughout 
the wet season, which traditionally lasts from around May until December and 
results in massive flooding of the Lower Mekong Basin. In turn, this flooding 
supports, ‘a productive and diverse freshwater ecosystem’, although it can, ‘also 
result in loss of human life and damage to crops and structures.’125 Such an 
abundance of water can be contrasted with the dry season that commences 
in December, when flows traditionally begin to recede and eventually reach 
their lowest levels in April. As Paisley highlights, the ‘dramatic reduction of 
flow leads to water shortages for domestic and agricultural use’ whereby, 
‘[e]quitable sharing of the water resources and sustainable development of 
the natural resources in the basin becomes most critical for each country.’126 
121   M. Osborne, River at Risk: The Mekong and Water Politics of China and Southeast Asia 
(London: Longueville Media 2004); E. Goh, Developing the Mekong: Regionalism and 
Regional Security in China-Southeast Asian Relations (Routledge, Abingdon 2007).
122   R. Paisley, ‘Adversaries into Partners: International Water Law and the Equitable Sharing 
of Downstream Benefits’, 3(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law (2002) 280–301, 
at 295.
123   MRC, The Flow of the Mekong (Vientiane: MRC 2009), at 4.
124   O. Toda, et al., ‘Evaluation of Tributaries Contribution in the Mekong River Basin During 
Rainy and Dry Season’, Proceedings of the 2nd Conference of the Asia Pacific Association 
of Hydrology and Water Resources, 239–248, 2004, Singapore.
125   Paisley, supra note 122.
126   Paisley, supra note 122.
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A major challenge, which will be considered below, is how the legal framework 
relating to the Mekong can account for these basin characteristics.
However, prior to exploring the evolution of cooperative legal arrangements 
relating to the Mekong, it is important to also recognise two other natural phe-
nomena of the basin, namely the the Tonlé Sap Lake in Cambodia and the 
Mekong Delta in Vietnam.
The Tonlé Sap is the largest freshwater lake in South East Asia and is a des-
ignated UNESCO Biosphere Reserve.127 The flow dynamics of the basin, as 
discussed above, dramatically affect the lake in so far as the vast differences 
in seasonal flows change the direction of the flow between the lake and the 
Mekong mainstream depending on whether it is the wet (flows from the main-
stream into the lake) or dry season (flows from the lake into the mainstream 
and thus dramatically shrinks the lake). Crucially, in terms of ecosystems and 
livelihoods, it is one of the most productive inland fisheries in the world.128 
Collectively, the fish in the Tonlé Sap Lake and the Mekong provide 80 percent 
of dietary protein for millions of Cambodians and Vietnamese.129 An impor-
tant component in sustaining such fish stocks is their ability to migrate up 
and down the Mekong and its tributaries in accordance with the wet and dry 
seasons.130
A further vital part of the Mekong’s ecosystem in terms of sustaining liveli-
hoods is the Mekong Delta in Vietnam, which accounts for approximately 20 
percent of that country’s total land area and supplies more than 50 percent of 
staple food.131 Consequently, the delta is often referred to as the ‘rice basket’ 
of Vietnam because its floodplains feed a large proportion of people living in 
the Lower Mekong Basin and in turn makes Vietnam “the second largest rice 
127   D. Lamberts, ‘The Tonle Sap Lake as a Productive Ecosystem’, 22(3) Water Resources 
Development (2006) 481–495.
128   N. Bonheur & B.D. Lane, ‘Natural Resources Management for Human Security in 
Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve’, 5(1) Environmental Science & Policy (2002) 
33–41.
129   G. Kite, Developing a Hydrological Model for the Mekong Basin—Impacts of Basin 
Development on Fisheries Productivity (Colombo: IWMI 2000), at 2.
130   P.J. Dugan, et al., ‘Fish Migration, Dams, and Loss of Ecosystem Services in the Mekong 
Basin’, 39(4) AMBIO (2010), 344–348; MRC, Fish Migrations of the Lower Mekong River 
Basin: Implications for Development, Planning and Environmental Management (Phnom 
Penh: MRC 2002).
131   M. Garschagen, et al., ‘Socio-Economic Development in the Mekong Delta: Between 
the Prospects for Progress and the Realms of Reality’, in F.G. Renaud & C. Kuenzer 
(eds.), The Mekong Delta System: Interdisciplinary Analyses of a River Delta (Dordrecht: 
Springer 2012).
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exporting country in the world.”132 The productivity of the delta is heavily reli-
ant not only on the waters flowing from the upstream of the Mekong, but also 
the transfer of sedimentation.133
Taken together, the Tonlé Sap and Mekong Delta form two distinct, naturally 
occurring aquatic ecosystems along the Mekong River and its tributaries; their 
water- and land-based resources have collectively supported countless genera-
tions of people living within this basin. The continued health and vitality of 
these finely balanced aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems is not only essential to 
the survival of all flora and fauna within these environments, but the daily sur-
vival and prosperity of most people across the region. It is within this unique 
geographical context that the Mekong Agreement and MRC evolved.
(b) Evolution and Status
Transboundary water cooperation in the Mekong River can be traced back 
to the early 1950s when Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam estab-
lished the Mekong Committee.134 Following the establishment of Mekong 
Committee, four distinct temporal periods in the cooperative governance of 
the Mekong can be identified. These four periods reflect a distinct legal frame-
work that was developed and adapted in response to change in the geopoliti-
cal and socio-economic context within the basin as well as the interests of 
its states.135
However, prior to this initial commencement of substantial cooperative 
efforts between the basin state, the nature of interaction between popula-
tions living along the Mekong’s mainstream and tributaries was characterised 
by war and conflict.136 Conflict between different basin states had for decades 
ruled out any meaningful attempts at basin-wide cooperation, let alone the 
creation of a legal instrument by which to govern development on the Mekong 
and its tributaries.137
132   Van Duyen, supra note 117, at 350.
133   D.E. Walling, ‘The Changing Sediment Load of the Mekong River’, 37(3) AMBIO (2008) 
150–157.
134   T. Myint, ‘Democracy in Global Environmental Governance: Issues, Interests, and Actors 
in the Mekong and the Rhine’, 10(1) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (2003) 287–314.
135   B.L. Bearden, ‘The Legal Regime of the Mekong River: A Look Back and Some Proposals 
for the Way Ahead’, 12 Water Policy (2010) 798–821, at 800.
136   Van Duyen, supra note 117, at 353.
137   P. Hirsh, ‘Beyond the Nation State: Natural Resource Conflict and National Interest in 
Mekong Hydropower Development’, 29(3) Golden Gate University Law Review (1999) 
399–414.
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The outset of basin cooperation from 1957 to 1975 was dominated by 
the UN-facilitated formation of the Committee for the Coordination of 
Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin (Mekong Committee) under the 
provisions of the 1957 Mekong Statute.138 Comprising the governments of 
Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand, the Mekong Committee’s man-
date, as per Article 4 of the Statute, was to ‘promote, coordinate, supervise 
and control the planning and investigation of water resources development 
projects.’139 The committee ‘developed as its centerpiece a plan for a Mekong 
cascade of large dams and reservoirs on the river’s mainstream, the impetus of 
which was strong US influence.’140
The period 1975 to 1978 was characterized by renewed conflict and politi-
cal changes within the region, highlighted by Cambodia leaving the existing 
framework for basin cooperation.141 Although the Mekong Committee was 
suspended as a result of ongoing tensions during this period, in 1975 the basin 
states concluded the Joint Declaration of Principles for the Utilisation of the 
Waters of the Lower Mekong Basin (Joint Declaration).142 Influenced in part 
by the globally recognized Helsinki Rules,143 this Declaration was considered 
to be ‘a milestone in the evolution of the Mekong regime.’144 Crucially, the Joint 
Declaration incorporated the cornerstone concepts of international water law, 
such as equitable and reasonable utilisation,145 the conservation of the basin, 
and pollution prevention. Additionally, ‘major’ tributaries were treated as part 
of the mainstream waters where dam developments were concerned.146 In line 
138   Statute of the Committee for Co-ordination of Investigations of Lower Mekong Basin 
(1957).
139   Ibid.
140   Bearden, supra note 135, at 800–801.
141   G. Browder & L. Ortolano, ‘The Evolution of an International Water Resources Manage-
ment Regime in the Mekong River Basin’ 40 Natural Resources Journal 499–531, at 
508–509.
142   Joint Declaration of Principles for Utilisation of the Waters of the Lower Mekong Basin 
(1975).
143   Supra note 38.
144   Browder & Ortolano, supra note 141, at 509.
145   Art. V reads: ‘Individual projects on the Mainstream shall be planned and implemented 
in a manner conducive to the system development of the Basin’s water resources, in the 
beneficial use of which each Basin State shall be entitled, within its territory, to a reason-
able and equitable share.’
146   Art. XXI stipulates that, ‘[a] tributary recognised by all Basin States as a Major Tributary 
shall be considered as an integral part of the Basin development system and shall be 
governed by the provisions of the present Declaration of Principles applicable to the 
Mainstream.’
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with the previous arrangements, all projects on the mainstream and tributar-
ies required the express prior approval of all the basin states.147
In 1978, given the abeyance of the Mekong Committee, Thailand, Laos and 
Vietnam established the Interim Mekong Committee.148 As a basin institu-
tion, it held an interim status because Cambodia at that time chose not to par-
ticipate. However, the other lower Mekong states proceeded with cooperative 
efforts in the hope that Cambodia would later re-join.149 What followed was 
an extended period of stasis during the 1980s. This period witnessed renewed 
nationalism and conflicts, coupled with China’s unilateral plans for a series of 
cascade hydropower dams at the head of the river in Yunnan province.150 With 
basin cooperation seemingly at a halt, the Interim Mekong committee dis-
banded in 1992.151
In stark contrast to the reign of the Interim Mekong Committee, there was 
a significant and rapid regional rapprochement during the early 1990s. This 
rapprochement reinvigorated basin-wide cooperation and attempted to codify 
a legal instrument for governance of the Mekong River.152 In parallel, crucial 
economic changes occurred, especially the opening of the national economies 
in the Lower Mekong Basin to overseas markets and investment, which has-
tened the impetus for re-establishing cooperative efforts to govern trans-
boundary water resources.153 By now, significant overseas interests had entered 
the region seeking to capitalize on this development-oriented and relatively 
stable geo-political climate in order to fund large-scale national hydropower 
projects along the Mekong River mainstream and, to a lesser extent, but no 
less importantly, also on some tributaries.154 This revitalized sense of regional 
cooperation for development, commonly referred to as the ‘Mekong Spirit’, is 
147   Art. XX stipulates that, ‘[e]xtra-basin diversion of mainstream waters by a riparian State 
shall require the agreement of all Basin States.’
148   N. Mirumachi, Transboundary Water Politics in the Developing World (Abingdon: Routledge 
2015), at 112.
149   Bearden, supra note 135, at 803.
150   F. Urban, et al., ‘An Analysis of China’s Investment in the Hydropower Sector in the Greater 
Mekong Sub-Region’, 15(2) Environment, Development and Sustainability (2013) 301–324.
151   Mirumachi, supra note 148.
152   Hirsch, supra note 137, at 404.
153   Paisley, supra note 122, at 296.
154   C. Middleton, J. Garcia & T. Foran, ‘Old and New Hydropower Players in the Mekong 
Region: Agendas and Strategies’, in F. Molle, T. Foran & M. Käkönen, Contested Waterscapes 
in the Mekong Region—Hydropower, Livelihoods and Governance (London, Earthscan 
2009) 23–54, at 26–29.
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oft acknowledged as one of the main reasons underpinning the creation of the 
Mekong Agreement.155
Following Cambodia’s request in 1991 to re-join cooperative negotiations, the 
Mekong Working Group was set up by the four lower Mekong states in order 
to develop a cooperative framework for the basin.156 The Mekong Working 
Group, with the assistance of the UN, initiated several rounds of closed-door 
negotiations between Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia which, at its last 
meeting in November 1994, culminated in the production of a Draft Agreement 
on Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin.157 
Signed on 5 April 1995, the Mekong Agreement was consequently adopted 
and resulted in the establishment of the MRC, thereby replacing the Interim 
Mekong Committee. This milestone event heralded the dawn of a new era in 
regional cooperation and the formation of the Mekong River Basin’s current 
legal framework.
(c) Overview
The 1995 Mekong Agreement is divided into six chapters and 42 articles. The 
objective of the Agreement is to foster cooperation,
. . . in all fields of sustainable development, utilisation, management and 
conservation of the water and related resources of the Mekong River 
Basin including, but not limited to irrigation, hydro-power, navigation, 
flood control, fisheries, timber floating, recreation and tourism, in a man-
ner to optimise the multiple-use and mutual benefits of all riparians and 
to minimise the harmful effects that might result from natural occur-
rences and man-made activities.158
There is an inherent paradox in the objective of the Mekong Agreement. While 
the agreement adopts a basin approach, it was only the four lower Mekong 
states (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam) that negotiated and adopted 
the instrument. It might therefore be questioned whether the overarching 
objective of the agreement can ever be attained without formal endorsement 
155   Bearden, supra note 135, at 800.
156   G. Browder, ‘An Analysis of the Negotiations for the 1995 Mekong Agreement’, 5(2) 
International Negotiations (2000) 237–261.
157   Radosevich & Olson, supra note 3.
158   Art. 1, Mekong Agreement.
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by the two upper Mekong states of China and Myanmar—particularly in light 
of China’s significant developments along the upper reaches of the river.159
In terms of substantive norms, and no doubt influenced by the work of 
the ILC on the law of the non-national uses of international watercourses, 
the Mekong Agreement sets out an obligation upon its parties to, ‘utilise the 
waters of the Mekong River system in a reasonable and equitable manner in 
their respective territories, pursuant to all relevant factors and circumstances.’160 
This cornerstone principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation is supple-
mented by an obligation upon parties to, ‘make every effort to avoid, minimize 
and mitigate harmful effects that might occur to the environment, especially 
the water quantity and quality, the aquatic (eco-system) conditions, and 
ecological balance of the river system, from the development and use of the 
Mekong River Basin water resources or discharge of wastes and return flows.’161 
The agreement goes on to provide that where harmful effects do cause sub-
stantial damage, the parties concerned should, ‘determine all relative factors, 
the cause, extent of damage and responsibility for damages caused by that 
state in conformity with the principles of international law relating to state 
responsibility.’162 More broadly, the Mekong Agreement also places its parties 
under a substantive obligation to, ‘protect the environment, natural resources, 
aquatic life and conditions, and ecological balance of the Mekong River Basin 
from pollution or other harmful effects resulting from any development plans 
and uses of water and related resources in the Basin.’163
The main procedural provisions of the Mekong Agreement relate to planned 
uses. A tiered system of notification, consultation and agreement is set out 
in the Agreement. The lower threshold of notification164 is required for intra-
basin and inter-basin diversions on the tributaries of the Mekong,165 as well 
as intra-basin uses on the mainstream of the Mekong River during the wet 
season.166 On the mainstream of the river, a middle threshold of prior 
159   M. Keskinen, K. Mehtonen & O. Varis, ‘Transboundary Cooperation vs. Internal Ambitions: 
The Role of China and Cambodia in the Mekong Region’, in I. Nevelina, et al. (eds), 
International Water Security: Domestic Threats and Opportunities (Tokyo: UN University 
Press 2008) 79–109.
160   Art. 5, Mekong Agreement.
161   Art. 7, Mekong Agreement.
162   Art. 8, Mekong Agreement.
163   Art. 3, Mekong Agreement.
164   ‘Notification’ is defined in Chapter II of the Mekong Agreement as meaning: ‘Timely pro-
viding information by a riparian to the Joint Committee on its Proposed use of water.’
165   Art. 5(A), Mekong Agreement.
166   Art. 5(B)(1)(a), Mekong Agreement.
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consultation167 is required for inter-basin diversions during the wet season and 
an intra-basin diversion during the dry-season. Finally, inter-basin diversion 
projects on the mainstream of the river during the dry season are subject to 
agreement by all parties.168
The Mekong Agreement also sets out the institutional framework that is 
designed to support its implementation. As originally envisaged, the MRC was 
the most publicized cooperative transboundary basin institution in the world, 
and it was proclaimed as a fundamental step towards overcoming the regional 
antagonisms of the past.169 The MRC is comprised of a Council, Joint Committee 
and Secretariat.170 The primary decision-making body is the Council, which 
meets in regular session once a year, and is made up of one member from each 
party who should be at ministerial or cabinet level.171 Decisions of the Council 
are to be made by unanimous vote unless agreed otherwise.172 The Council is 
supported by the Joint Committee, which meets in regular session twice a year, 
and is made up of one member from each party who should be ‘no less than 
Head of Department level.’173 The primary function of the Joint Committee is 
to oversee and monitor the implementation of the decisions made by the MRC 
Council. Additionally, the MRC is comprised of a secretariat that provides ‘tech-
nical and administrative services’ to the Council and the Joint Committee.174
Outside these three institutional pillars, the National Mekong Committees 
(NMCs) perform a vital but often-overlooked role by linking government 
departments to the main MRC structure and functions. The NMCs consequently 
coordinate MRC programs at the national level through NMC Secretariats in 
each country, and they provide links between the MRC Secretariat and the 
167   ‘Prior consultation’ is defined in Chapter II of the Agreement as meaning: ‘Timely noti-
fication plus additional data and information to the Joint Committee as provided in the 
Rules for Water Utilisation and Inter-Basin Diversion under Article 26, that would allow 
the other member riparians to discuss and evaluate the impact of the Proposed Use upon 
their uses of water and any other effects, which is the basis for arriving at an agreement. 
Prior consultation is neither a right to veto the use nor unilateral right to use water by any 
riparian without taking into account other riparians’ rights.’
168   Art. 5(B)(2)(b), Mekong Agreement.
169   J.W. Jacobs, ‘The Mekong River Commission: Transboundary Water Resources Planning 
and Regional Security’, 168(4) The Geographical Journal (2002) 354–364, at 354. Sneddon 
& Fox, supra note 5, at 184.
170   Art. 12, Mekong Agreement.
171   Arts. 15 & 17, Mekong Agreement.
172   Art. 20, Mekong Agreement.
173   Art. 21 & 23, Mekong Agreement.
174   Art. 28, Mekong Agreement.
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appropriate national ministries and line agencies.175 The specific organization 
and structure of the NMCs is left to the discretion of the respective states, and 
according to Hirsch, ‘[t]he technical and political strengths of the NMCs vary 
from one riparian to another.’176
According to its Mission Statement, the over-arching mandate of the MRC 
is ‘to promote and coordinate sustainable management and development of 
water and related resources for the countries’ mutual benefit and the people’s 
well-being.’177 The MRC’s primary role is therefore one of coordination and 
fostering cooperation between member states via joint initiatives and policy 
measures. In considering the reach of the MRC, as provided for under the MRC, 
it is important to note that its decision-making and executive power is con-
strained. As Osborne points out, ‘the MRC is a “creature” of the governments 
that are members of the Commission. While its critics might want it to be oth-
erwise, the MRC has no mandate to act on its own in any fashion that has not 
been approved by the member countries.’178 This places a critical limitation 
on the powers of the MRC whereby ‘diplomacy, negotiation, and persuasion 
are the main tools at its disposal. As such, although the MRC was established 
by a formal Agreement, it is still largely depending upon the goodwill of its 
member States.’179
It is perhaps due to this limitation that the technical and scientific aspects 
of the MRC’s work have received the majority of attention, as well as funding 
from external donors. This has resulted in the compilation of invaluable and 
extensive databases of information pertaining to key aspects such as hydrology, 
geography and fisheries covering both the basin as a whole as well as specific 
states and areas therein.180 Indeed, some scientific studies have been ongoing 
to the extent that, ‘[s]ince 1995, donors have invested substantially in fisheries 
175   P. Hirsch, ‘Water Governance and Catchment Management in the Mekong Region’, 15(2) 
The Journal of Environment & Development’, (2006) 184–201, at 192.
176   Ibid.
177   MRC, Vision & Mission, http://www.mrcmekong.org/about-mrc/vision-and-mission 
(accessed 25 November 2015).
178   M. Osborne, River at Risk: The Mekong and the Water Politics of China and Southeast Asia 
(Double Bay: Longueville Media 2004), at 9.
179   A. Rieu-Clarke & G. Gooch, ‘Governing the Tributaries of the Mekong—The Contribution 
of International Law and Institutions to Enhancing Equitable Cooperation Over the 
Sesan’, 22 Pacific McGeorge Global Business and Development Law Journal (2009) 193–
224, at 217.
180   Van Duyen, supra note 117, at 373.
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research by the MRC Secretariat’181 the results of which, ‘confirm the immense 
value and productivity of the Mekong’s capture fisheries, which are contingent 
on maintaining the ecological integrity of the Mekong river system.’182
Since its inception, the controversial issue of hydropower dams, especially 
those on the mainstream of the Mekong River, but also on certain tributar-
ies, has been at the centre of much of the MRC’s work.183 In this regard, the 
MRC has performed a variety of facilitative and policy-making functions within 
the limits of its mandate in order to inform and try to improve the impact 
 analysis, negotiation and decision-making processes, as well as to provide the 
tools and knowledge base for its member states on large-scale hydropower 
projects.184
The final key area of the Mekong Agreement related to the settlement of 
disputes. Pursuant to the Agreement, parties should first seek to resolve any 
‘difference or dispute’185 through the Joint Committee and Council. Failing 
that, the Agreement provides that, ‘the issue shall be referred to the govern-
ments to take cognizance of the matter for resolution by negotiation through 
diplomatic channels within a timely manner.’186 Additionally, the parties are 
encouraged, ‘should they find it necessary or beneficial’, and by mutual agree-
ment, to seek third-party support in order to resolve the dispute.187
181   G. Lee & N. Scurrah, Power and Responsibility—The Mekong River Commission and Lower 
Mekong Mainstream Dams (Sydney: Oxfam Australia & University of Sydney 2009), at 7.
182   Ibid.
183   See generally, F. Molle, T. Foran & M. Käkönen, Contested Waterscapes in the Mekong 
Region—Hydropower, Livelihoods and Governance (London: Earthscan 2010).
184   MRC, Basin Development Strategy 2016–2010, 5 April 2016, http://www.mrcmekong.org/
assets/Publications/strategies-workprog/MRC-BDP-strategy-complete-final-02.16.pdf 
(accessed 25 November 2016); MRC, Guidelines for the Evaluation of Hydropower and 
Multi-purpose Project Portfolios, 2 November 2015 http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/
Publications/policies/1.-FINAL-ISH02-Guidelines-v1.5-updated-29Mar2016.pdf (accessed 
25 November 2016); MRC, Guiding Considerations on Transboundary Monitoring for LMB 
Hydropower Planning and Management, 16 December 2014, http://www.mrcmekong.org/
publications/topic/sustainable-hydropower, 25 November 2016; MRC, Rapid Basin-wide 
Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Tool, 2 December 2014, http://www.mrcmekong 
.org/assets/Publications/Reports/ISH-RST-Assessment-final-Draft-full-2013.pdf (accessed 
25 November 2016).
185   While the terms ‘difference’ and ‘dispute’ are used within the Mekong Agreement, the 
distinction between them is not explained therein.
186   Art. 25, Mekong Agreement.
187   Art. 35, Mekong Agreement.
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Between 2000 and 2008, the MRC codified a suite of procedures to com-
plement the general provisions in the Mekong Agreement, namely: the 
Procedures for Data and Information Exchange and Sharing, approved 
in 2001;188 Procedures for Water Use Monitoring, approved in 2003;189 Proce-
dures for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement (PNPCA), approved in 
2003;190 Procedures for Maintenance of Flows on the Mainstream, approved 
in 2006;191 and Procedures for Water Quality, approved in 2011.192 These Pro-
cedures have subsequently been accompanied by MRC Guidelines that are 
designed to assist in their implementation.193 While these specific procedures 
were required to be developed under Articles 5, 6, and 26 of the Agreement, 
they are external to the treaty instrument and are not considered to be legally 
binding.194
188   MRC, Procedures for Data and Information Exchange, 1 November 2001, http://www 
.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/policies/Procedures-Data-Info-Exchange-n 
-Sharing.pdf (accessed 25 November 2016).
189   MRC, Procedures for Water Use Monitoring, 30 November 2003, http://www.mrcmekong 
.org/assets/Publications/policies/Procedures-Water-Use-Monitoring.pdf (accessed 
25 November 2016).
190   MRC, Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement, 30 November 2003, 
http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/policies/Procedures-Notification-Prior-
Consultation-Agreement.pdf (accessed 25 November 2016) (PNPCA Procedures).
191   MRC, Procedures for the Maintenance of Flows on the Mainstream, 22 June 2006, http://
www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/policies/Procedures-Maintenance-Flows.pdf 
(accessed 25 November 2016).
192   MRC, Procedures for Water Quality, 26 January 2011, http://www.mrcmekong.org/ 
assets/Publications/policies/Procedures-for-Water-Quality-council-approved260111.pdf 
(accessed 25 November 2016).
193   MRC, Guidelines on Implementation of the Procedures for Water Use Monitoring, 
22 January 2006, http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Uploads/Tech-Guidelines-PWUM.
pdf (accessed 25 November 2015); MRC, Guidelines on Implementation of the Procedures 
for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement, 31 August 2005, http://www 
.mrcmekong.org/publications/policies-procedures-and-guidelines/?start=10 (accessed 
25 November 2016); MRC, Guidelines for Management of the Mekong River Commission 
Hydrometeorological Network, 31 August 2005, http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/
Uploads/Tech-Guidelines-Data-Info-Exchange-n-Sharing.pdf (accessed 25 November 2016).
194   Bearden et al., supra note 120, at 185; Q. Gao, A Procedural Framework for Transboundary 
Water Management in the Mekong River Basin (London: Brill 2014), at 152; B. Boer, et al., 
The Mekong: A Socio-legal Approach to River Basin Development (Abingdon: Routledge 
2015), at 87; Y. Yasuda, Rules, Norms and NGO Advocacy Strategies: Hydropower 
Development in the Mekong River (Abingdon: Routledge 2015).
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B Comparing the Mekong Agreement, the UN Watercourses 
Convention and the UNECE Water Convention
The previous section has provided an overview of the Mekong Agreement, the 
UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE Water Convention. The purpose 
of this section is to investigate how the provisions from one or both global 
water conventions could translate to stronger principles and clarified pro-
cesses for supporting transboundary river governance in the Mekong Basin. 
The similarities and differences between the two global water conventions and 
the Mekong Agreement will be considered. Ultimately, it is hoped that it will 
be possible to, firstly, ascertain if the two global water conventions are compat-
ible with the Mekong Agreement; and secondly, whether there might be any 
gain for the states of the Mekong in joining one, or both, of the global water 
conventions in order to strengthen the Mekong Agreement.
I Scope and Objectives
The legal scope of an international watercourse agreement defines the func-
tional reach of an agreement, the geographical and hydrological parameters to 
which it applies, and the subjects of the agreement.195
In terms of its functional scope, the Mekong Agreement might at first glance 
appear to adopt a broad approach in professing to cover, ‘all fields of sustain-
able development, utilisation, management and conservation of the water 
and related resources of the Mekong River Basin.’ [Emphasis added]. The UN 
Watercourses Convention and UNECE Water Convention might appear nar-
rower in simply referring to the ‘protection, preservation and management of 
international watercourses,’196 and the ‘protection and use of transboundary 
watercourses and international lakes,’197 respectively. This raises the question 
of whether the concept of sustainability is adequately addressed in the two 
global water conventions, and also whether the use of the term ‘river basin’ 
in the Mekong Agreement offers a wider scope than the term ‘watercourse’, 
which is employed in both global water conventions.
Both of these issues will be addressed below. The geographical scope of 
the instruments will be examined, and secondly, the reach of the substantive 
195   P.K. Wouters, et al., Sharing Transboundary Waters—An Integrated Assessment of 
Equitable Entitlement (Paris: UNESCO 2005), at 19; S. Vinogradov, P. Wouters & P. Jones, 
Transforming Potential Conflict into Cooperation Potential: The Role of International Water 
Law (Paris: UNESCO 2003), at 16.
196   Art. 1, UN Watercourses Convention.
197   Preamble, UNECE Water Convention.
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and procedural norms will be considered. A further point to note concerning 
functional scope is that the Mekong Agreement professes to cover issues of 
navigation,198 whereas the UN Watercourses Convention explicitly states that, 
‘[t]he uses of international watercourses for navigation is not within the scope 
of the present Convention except insofar as other uses affect navigation or are 
affected by navigation.’199 However, a review of all three instruments shows 
that there are no specific provisions dealing with the regulation of navigation.200
The geographical and hydrological terms and approaches adopted by the 
three instruments differ. The Mekong Agreement does not define the scope 
of the agreement, but adopts the term ‘Mekong River Basin’, and makes ref-
erence to the basin’s ‘water and related resources for navigational and non- 
navigational purposes.’201 The agreement also uses the terms ‘river basin’, ‘basin 
level’, ‘basin-wide’, and ‘river system’ throughout the text, but without defining 
any of the terms.202 Additionally, the Mekong Agreement refers to the term 
‘tributary’ yet does not define it.203 This distinction between the ‘mainstream’ 
and ‘tributaries’ within the text, without defining the difference, has signifi-
cant legal ramifications for the prior notification and consultation procedures 
under the Agreement. This distinction will be discussed when comparing the 
procedural aspects of the legal instruments.
Rather than referring to the ‘basin’ or distinguishing between ‘mainstream’ 
and ‘tributaries’, both the UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE Water 
Convention employ the more precise terms of ‘international watercourse’ and 
‘transboundary waters.’ There is a difference between the definitions provided 
in the two global water instruments. The UNECE Water Convention stipulates 
198   Article 1 of the Mekong Agreement sets out fields of cooperation, which include ‘irriga-
tion, hydro-power, navigation, flood control, fisheries, timber floating, recreation and 
tourism.’
199   Art. 1(2), UN Watercourses Convention.
200   In 1998, Vietnam and Cambodia entered into an Agreement on Waterway Transportation 
with the aim of reducing restrictions on cross-border navigation, and to improve effi-
ciency and safety standards, see http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/policies 
/agreement-waterway-trans-btw-Cam-n-VN-Eng.pdf (accessed 25 November 2016).
201   Preamble, Mekong Agreement.
202   For a commentary see, B.L. Bearden, ‘Following the Proper Channels: Tributaries in the 
Mekong Legal Regime’, 14(6) Water Policy (2012) 991–1014.
203   The term ‘tributary’ is defined in the PNPCA Procedures, supra note 190, which states 
that, ‘[f]or the purposes of the present Procedures, a tributary as decided by the JC [Joint 
Committee] is a natural stream of the Mekong River System whose flows have a signifi-
cant impact on the mainstream. This definition is subject to be reviewed and agreed upon 
after some time of implementation if any concern is raised.’
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that ‘transboundary waters’ refers to ‘any surface or ground waters which mark, 
cross or are located on boundaries between two or more States,’204 whereas 
the UN Watercourses Convention defines a ‘watercourse’ as, ‘a system of sur-
face waters and groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical relation-
ship a unitary whole.’205 In the use of the phrase, ‘surface or groundwaters’, 
the UNECE Water Convention therefore adopts a wider approach than the 
UN Watercourses Convention by extending its scope beyond just ground-
water connected to surface water to any groundwater that crosses sovereign 
boundaries.206
Whilst no explicit mention of groundwater is contained in the Mekong 
Agreement, it could be argued that the interconnectivity between surface water 
and groundwater is encompassed within the term ‘basin.’ Interpretative guid-
ance on this point might be found in the 1966 International Law Association’s 
(ILA) Helsinki Rules, which defines an ‘international drainage basin’ as ‘a geo-
graphical area extending over two or more States determined by the water-
shed limits of the system of waters, including surface and underground waters, 
flowing into a common terminus.’207 Several transboundary aquifers have 
been identified within the Mekong River Basin, namely the Lancang River 
Downstream Aquifer (China and Myanmar), the Mekong River midstream 
aquifer (Thailand, Laos and Vietnam), Khorat Plateau aquifer (Thailand and 
Laos), and the Mekong River delta aquifer (Cambodia and Vietnam).208 In 
addition, groundwater overexploitation and pollution have been identified as 
major challenges faced by the states sharing these transboundary aquifers.209 
The need to recognise the linkages between groundwater and surface water 
within the Mekong Basin is evident.
In looking at approaches by which to strengthen cooperation over these 
transboundary aquifers, the Mekong states might turn to the 2008 ILC Draft 
Articles on Transboundary Aquifers210 and the UNECE Model Provisions on 
204   Art. 1(1).
205   Art. 2(1).
206   See UNECE, supra note 108, 21–16.
207   Art. II, Helsinki Rules, supra note 38.
208   K. Ha, et al., Current Status and Issue of Groundwater in the Mekong River Basin (Bangkok: 
KIGAM, CCOP & UNESCO 2015), at 50.
209   Ibid., at 53.
210   ILC, Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers, in UN General Assembly Official Records, 
61st Session, Report of the International Law Commission, 2008, UN Doc. A/63/10; and 
UNECE, supra note 84. See also UN, ‘While Management of Transboundary Aquifers 
Critical for 2030 Agenda Success, Draft Articles Must be Tailored to Each State, Speakers 
Tell Sixth Committee’, 20 October 2016, UN Doc. GA/L/3528.
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Transboundary Groundwaters.211 As well as endorsing the key rules and princi-
ples that are found in the UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE Water 
Convention, the UNECE Model Provisions and the ILC Draft Articles empha-
sise the need for states: to cooperate in the identification, delineation and char-
acterisation of transboundary aquifers;212 to jointly monitor the conditions of 
transboundary aquifers;213 to develop joint management plans;214 and to pro-
tect recharge and discharge zones of transboundary aquifers.215 Both these 
latter instruments can therefore, to a large extent, be seen as complement-
ing the more general rules and principles contained in the UN Watercourses 
Convention and the UNECE Water Convention, and could complement the 
existing 1995 Mekong Agreement with more bespoke provisions relating to 
transboundary aquifers.
In terms of the legal scope of the three instruments, some differences can 
be identified. The Mekong Agreement has, ‘no retroactive effect upon activi-
ties and projects previously existing on the date of signature by the appointed 
plenipotentiaries.’216 However, the Agreement does explicitly state that it 
replaces a number of existing agreements that relate to the Mekong River.217 
The Mekong Agreement goes on to stipulate that it does not, ‘replace or take 
precedence over any other treaties, acts or agreements entered into by and 
among any of the parties hereto, except that where a conflict in terms, areas of 
jurisdiction of subject matter or operation of any entities created under exist-
ing agreements occurs with any provisions of this Agreement.’218 This provi-
sion, while somewhat circular in nature, ultimately stipulates that the Mekong 
Agreement takes precedence over all matters covered thereunder. Such an 
approach might be contrasted by the UN Watercourses Convention, which 
stipulates that, ‘nothing in the present Convention shall affect the rights or 
obligations of a watercourse State arising from agreements in force for it on the 
211   https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/water/publications/WAT_model_provisions/
ece_mp.wat_40_eng.pdf.
212   Provision 3, Model Provisions; and Art. 8, Draft Articles.
213   Provision 3, Model Provisions; and Art. 13, Draft Articles.
214   Provision 4 & 7, Model Provisions; and Art. 4, Draft Articles.
215   Provision 5(2), Model Provisions; and Art. 11, Draft Articles.
216   Art. 36, Mekong Agreement.
217   These are the Statute of the Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower 
Mekong Basin of 1957 as amended, the Joint Declaration of Principles for Utilization of 
the Waters of the Lower Mekong Basin of 1975, the Declaration Concerning the Interim 
Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin of 1978, and all 
Rules of Procedures adopted under these agreements.
218   Art. 36(B), Mekong Agreement.
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date on which it became a party to the present Convention.’219 However, states 
are encouraged to consider harmonising existing agreements with the basic 
principles of the Convention.220 The UNECE Water Convention is slightly more 
forceful on this point in that it requires its riparian parties to adapt existing 
agreements in order to ensure that they at least align to the basic principles set 
out in the Convention.221 Whether or not the Mekong Agreement is consistent 
with the basic principles of the UNECE Water Convention will be explored in 
the subsequent sections.
Future agreements are also covered in both the UN Watercourses Con-
vention and the UNECE Water Convention. Under the UN Watercourses 
Convention, there is no obligation to enter into watercourse agreements. 
Rather, the parties are encouraged to enter into agreements, ‘which apply and 
adjust the provisions of the Convention to the characteristics and uses of a 
particular international watercourse or part thereof.’222 This has implica-
tions that are directly relevant to the Mekong Basin in so far as under the UN 
Watercourses Convention, ‘when some, but not all, watercourse states to a par-
ticular international watercourse are parties to an agreement, nothing in such 
an agreement would affect the rights or obligations under the Convention of 
watercourse states that are not parties to such an agreement.’223
The legal rights and duties of China and Myanmar as non-parties to the 
Mekong Agreement are therefore preserved if the current members of 
the Mekong Agreement all joined the Watercourses Convention. However, a 
slightly different approach is set forth under the UNECE Water Convention. 
Thereunder riparian parties must, ‘enter into bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments or other arrangements, where they do not exist’ in order to support the 
implementation of the provisions of the Convention.224 If China and Myanmar 
were also party to the UNECE Water Convention, they would, according to this 
latter requirement, be obliged to enter into an agreement with the other states 
of the Mekong River Basin. However, in the situation where the Lower Mekong 
Basin states were party to the UNECE Water Convention, and China and/or 
Myanmar were not members, then there would be no obligation on the lower 
219   Art. 3(1), UN Watercourses Convention.
220   Art. 3(2), UN Watercourses Convention.
221   Art. 9, UNECE Watercourses Convention. See also supra note 89, and accompanying text.
222   Art. 3, UN Watercourses Convention.
223   S. Salman, ‘Entry into Force of the UN Watercourses Convention: Why Should It Matter?’, 
31 International Journal of Water Resources Development (2014) 4–16, at. 8; See also 
Salman, supra note 29, at 5.
224   Art. 9(1), UNECE Water Convention.
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Mekong states to enter agreements with these non-parties. Such a situation 
reflects a general obligation under customary international law, whereby states 
are obliged to negotiate agreements in good faith, but the law falls short of 
requiring those states to enter into an agreement.225
II Substantive Norms
(a) Equitable and Reasonable Utilisation
The Mekong Agreement, the UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE 
Water Convention provide for similar substantive norms, although the norms 
are presented differently in each instrument.
Under the Mekong Agreement, states are obliged to, ‘utilise the waters of the 
Mekong River System in a reasonable and equitable manner,’ pursuant to rel-
evant factors and circumstances.226 However, the Agreement does not provide 
any list of relevant factors and circumstances. In determining what is equi-
table and reasonable, some guidance is provided through the requirement that 
the parties cooperate in the maintenance of flows on the mainstream in order 
to: provide an acceptable minimum monthly natural flow during each month 
of the dry season; enable an acceptable natural reverse flow of the Tonlé Sap 
during the wet season; and prevent average daily peak flows that are greater 
than those that naturally occur during the flood season.227 Furthermore, the 
Mekong Agreement commits the parties to develop Rules for Water Utilisation 
and Inter-Basin Diversions, which should establish a timeframe for the wet and 
dry seasons; set the location of hydrological stations, and determine and 
maintain flow level requirements for each station; and set criteria for deter-
mining surplus quantities of water during the dry season on the mainstream.228 
However, to date, the Rules for Water Utilisation and Inter-Basin Diversions 
have not been fully completed.
Both the UN Watercourses Convention and UNECE Water Convention also 
oblige states to utilise their international watercourses in an equitable and rea-
sonable manner.229 However, the UN Watercourses Convention goes further 
by listing the factors and circumstances that should be taken into account in 
determining what is equitable and reasonable. Article 6 of the latter instru-
ment sets out those factors and circumstances as including: the natural char-
acteristics of an international watercourse; the socio-economic needs of the 
225   See Lake Lannoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), 24 ILR (1957) 101.
226   Art. 5, Mekong Agreement.
227   Art. 6, Mekong Agreement.
228   Art. 26, Mekong Agreement.
229   Art. 5, UN Watercourses Convention and Art. 2(C), UNECE Water Convention.
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watercourse states concerned; the population dependent on the watercourse 
in each watercourse state; the effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in 
one watercourse state on other watercourse states; existing and potential 
uses of the watercourse; conservation, protection, development and economy 
of use of the water resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures 
taken to that effect; and the availability of alternatives to a particular existing 
or planned use.230 The UN Watercourses Convention goes on to stipulate that 
in determining what is equitable and reasonable, special regard must be given 
to the requirements of ‘vital human needs.’231 ‘Vital human needs’ encom-
pass, ‘sufficient water to sustain human life, including both drinking water 
and water required for the production of food in order to prevent starvation.’232 
Within the context of the Mekong, water to sustain livelihoods from fisheries 
and agriculture might be seen as falling within the category of vital human 
needs. It could therefore be argued that the UN Watercourses Convention 
helps support the interpretation of the more general provisions found in the 
Mekong Agreement when interpreting the principle of equitable and reason-
able utilisation, and places particular emphasis on the need to protect vital 
human needs.
(b) Duty to Take All Appropriate Measures to Prevent Significant 
Harm
The duty to take all appropriate measures to prevent significant harm is cov-
ered in the Mekong Agreement, the UN Watercourses Convention and the 
UNECE Water Convention. However, each instrument includes different ter-
minology and formulations, which raises a question over their compatibility.
As noted previously, under the Mekong Agreement, states are under a gen-
eral obligation to, ‘make every effort to avoid, minimise and mitigate harm-
ful effects that might occur to the environment [emphasis added],’233 This 
requirement has some similarity with the UNECE Water Convention, which 
requires parties to, ‘take all appropriate measures to prevent, control and 
230   Art. 6, UN Watercourses Convention.
231   Art. 10, UN Watercourses Convention.
232   Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
and Commentaries Thereto in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1994, Vol. II 
(pt. 2) (1994 Draft Articles), at 110. See, P.H. Gleick, ‘The Human Right to Water’, 1 Water 
Policy (1998) 487–503, at 495; H. Shuval, ‘Meeting Vital Human Needs: Equitable 
Resolution of Conflicts Over Shared Water Resources of Israelis and Palestinians’, in 
H. Shuval & H. Dweik, Water Resources in the Middle East (Berlin: Springer 2007), 3–16; 
S. McCaffrey, supra note 9, at 255.
233   Art. 7, Mekong Agreement.
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reduce any transboundary impact [emphasis added]’, and the duty under the 
UN Watercourses Convention to ‘take all appropriate measures to prevent 
the causing of significant harm [emphasis added].’234
However, a number of differences between the three instruments can be 
seen in the formulation of this obligation to prevent significant harm.
Firstly, the object of the duty differs slightly. The UN Watercourses Conven-
tion refers to, ‘significant harm to other watercourse States.’235 The ILC has 
suggested that ‘The term “significant” is not without ambiguity and a determi-
nation has to be made in each specific case.’236 However, it goes on to suggest 
that, ‘significant’, ‘is something more than “detectable” but need not be at the 
level of “serious” or “substantial.” The harm must lead to a real detrimental 
effect on matters such as, for example, human health, industry, property, envi-
ronment or agriculture in other States.’237
In contrast, the UNECE Water Convention incorporates a threshold into 
the definition of ‘transboundary impact’, namely, ‘any significant adverse effect 
on the environment resulting from a change in the conditions of transbound-
ary waters caused by a human activity, the physical origin of which is situated 
wholly or in part within an area under the jurisdiction of a Party, within an area 
under the jurisdiction of another Party [emphasis added].’238
In the opinion of the ILC, the term ‘significant adverse effect’ is considered 
to be a lower threshold than that of ‘significant harm.’239 Both formulations 
differ from the Mekong Agreement, which in the first part of Article 7 simply 
refers to ‘harmful effects that might occur to the environment.’240 However, all 
three instruments qualify this so-called ‘no harm’ obligation. In the Mekong 
Agreement, states are under an obligation to ‘make every effort to avoid, mini-
mize and mitigate harmful effects that might occur to the environment.’241 
Under the UNECE Water Convention and the UN Watercourses Convention, the 
states are obliged to take ‘all appropriate measures’ to ‘prevent the causing sig-
nificant harm to other watercourse States’ (in the case of the UN Watercourses 
Convention), and ‘prevent, control and reduce any transboundary impact’ 
234   Art. 1(1), UNECE Water Convention.
235   Art. 7, UN Watercourses Convention.
236   Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, with 
Commentaries, in Yearbook of the International, 2001, Vol. II (pt. 2), at 152.
237   Ibid.
238   Art. 1, UNECE Water Convention.
239   1994 Draft Articles, supra note 232, at 111.
240   Art. 7, Mekong Agreement.
241   Art. 7, Mekong Agreement.
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(in the case of the UNECE Water Convention). The ILC has described this obliga-
tion as one of ‘due diligence’, and further commented that, ‘[i]t is not intended 
to guarantee that in utilizing an international watercourse significant harm 
would not occur. It is an obligation of conduct, and an obligation of result.’242 
The precise application of this obligation will depend both on the nature of the 
activity in question and the capacity of states to prevent, control or reduce 
such harm. States with greater capacity (technical or financial) to prevent 
harm may be placed under a higher standard that other states. Similarly, where 
there is a risk that an activity may cause irreparable harm to the environment, 
more stringent measure to prevention such harm will be required; whereas 
in other circumstances it might suffice that a state minimizes or controls the 
harm in question.
This due diligence standard, which is provided for in each of the legal 
instruments, leaves the states with considerable discretion to determine, 
firstly, what measures might be put in place, and secondly, whether harm 
should be prevented, controlled or reduced. The ILC has suggested that this 
so-called ‘duty of conduct’ is one that would require a state to enforce its laws, 
prevent or terminate illegal activity, or punish those that might be responsible 
for breaching those laws.243 The ICJ has also suggested that an Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) can be considered to be part of a due diligence obli-
gation where there is a risk of transboundary harm.244 The UN Watercourses 
Convention also suggests that appropriate measures to prevent, reduce and 
control pollution might include: setting joint water quality objectives and cri-
teria; establishing techniques and practices to address pollution from point 
and non-point sources; and establishing lists of substances whose introduc-
tion into the waters of an international watercourse would be prohibited, 
limited, investigated or monitored.’245 Additional ‘appropriate’ measures 
might be interpreted from the procedural requirements contained in the UN 
Watercourses Convention and UNECE Water Convention (as discussed below).
However, in the context of transboundary waters, the UNECE Water 
Convention provides the most detail related to ‘appropriate measures.’ In 
Article 3, the UNECE Water Convention stipulates that, in order to:
242   1994 Draft Articles, supra note 232, at 103. See also J. Kulesza, Due Diligence in International 
Law (London: Brill 2016); R.P. Barnidge, ‘The Due Diligence Principle under International 
Law’, 8(1) International Community Law Review (2006) 81–121.
243   1994 Draft Articles, supra note 232, at 103.
244   ICJ, Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgement, 
20 April 2010, para. 204.
245   Art. 21(3), UN Watercourses Convention.
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prevent, control and reduce transboundary impact, the parties shall 
develop, adopt, implement and, as far as possible, render compatible rel-
evant legal, administrative, economic, financial and technical measures, 
in order to ensure, inter alia, that:
(a)  The emission of pollutants is prevented, controlled and reduced at 
source through the application of, inter alia, low- and non-waste 
technology;
(b)  Transboundary waters are protected against pollution from point 
sources through the prior licensing of waste-water discharges by 
the competent national authorities, and that the authorized dis-
charges are monitored and controlled;
(c)  Limits for waste-water discharges stated in permits are based on the 
best available technology for discharges of hazardous substances;
(d)  Stricter requirements, even leading to prohibition in individual 
cases, are imposed when the quality of the receiving water or the 
ecosystem so requires;
(e)  At least biological treatment or equivalent processes are applied 
to municipal waste-water, where necessary in a step-by-step 
approach;
(f)  Appropriate measures are taken, such as the application of the best 
available technology, in order to reduce nutrient inputs from indus-
trial and municipal sources;
(g)  Appropriate measures and best environmental practices are devel-
oped and implemented for the reduction of inputs of nutrients and 
hazardous substances from diffuse sources, especially where the 
main sources are from agriculture (guidelines for developing best 
environmental practices are given in annex II to this Convention);
(h)  Environmental impact assessment and other means of assessment 
are applied;
(i)  Sustainable water-resources management, including the applica-
tion of the ecosystems approach, is promoted;
(j)  Contingency planning is developed;
(k)  Additional specific measures are taken to prevent the pollution of 
groundwaters; and
(l)  The risk of accidental pollution is minimized.246
246   Art. 3, UNECE Water Convention.
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In setting out the key measures that states should adopt in order to prevent, 
control and reduce transboundary impact, the UNECE Water Convention 
offers additional interpretative guidance to the more general ‘make every 
effort’ requirement under the UN Watercourses Convention.
Another area in which the UNECE Water Convention adds further inter-
pretive guidance relates to the definition of ‘harm’ or ‘impact.’ ‘Harm’ is not 
defined in the UN Watercourses Convention. Under the Mekong Agreement, 
‘harmful effects’ are described as including, ‘the water quantity and quality, the 
aquatic (eco-system) conditions, and ecological balance of the river system, 
from the development and use of the Mekong River Basin water resources or 
discharge of wastes and return flows.’247 The UNECE Water Convention goes 
further by providing the most detailed account of ‘transboundary impact’, 
which includes, ‘effects on human health and safety, flora, fauna, soil, air, water, 
climate, landscape and historical monuments or other physical structures or 
the interaction among these factors; they also include effects on the cultural 
heritage or socio-economic conditions resulting from alterations to those 
factors.’248
(c) The Relationship between Equitable and Reasonable Utilisation 
and No Significant Harm
The two global water conventions clearly set out the relationship between the 
principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation, and the duty to prevent sig- 
nificant harm.249 The UN Watercourses Convention provides that where 
significant harm occurs, the states must consider whether or not it might 
be eliminated or mitigated on the basis of equity.250 The primacy of the prin-
ciple of equitable and reasonable utilisation is therefore secured pursuant to 
the UN Watercourses Convention. The UNECE Water Convention obliges its 
parties to, ‘take all appropriate measures’, ‘to ensure that transboundary waters 
are used in a reasonable and equitable way.’251 The principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilisation under the UNECE Water Convention would therefore 
247   Art. 7, Mekong Agreement.
248   Art. 1(2), UNECE Water Convention.
249   See A.E. Utton, ‘Which Rule Should Prevail in International Water Disputes: That of 
Reasonableness or That of No Harm’, 36 Natural Resources Journal (1996) 635–641; 
P. Wouters, ‘An Assessment of Recent Developments in International Watercourse Law 
Through the Prism of the Substantive Rules Governing Use Allocation’, 36(2) Natural 
Resources Journal (1996) 417–439.
250   Art. 7(2), UN Watercourses Convention.
251   Art. 2(1), UNECE Water Convention.
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dictate what measures are deemed appropriate in the prevention, control or 
reduction of transboundary impact.
While the two global instruments therefore seek to reach the same goal, and 
use equitable and reasonable utilisation as the guiding principle, the Mekong 
Agreement is less clear on this matter. Article 7 provides a general obligation 
upon parties to ‘make every effort to avoid, minimise and mitigate harmful 
effects that might occur to the environment.’ As noted above, while this might 
be seen as a due diligence obligation, it does not state whether such harm 
must be transboundary, nor does it state how it relates to the obligation under 
Article 5 of the Mekong Agreement, ‘to utilise the waters of the Mekong River 
system in a reasonable and equitable manner.’ Article 7 does go on to stipulate 
that, ‘[w]here one or more State is notified with proper and valid evidence 
that it is causing substantial damage to one or more riparians from the use of 
and/or discharge to water of the Mekong River, that state or states shall cease 
immediately the alleged cause of harm until such harm is determined in accor-
dance with Article 8.’
Article 8 goes on to provide that:
Where harmful effects cause substantial damage to one or more riparians 
from the use of and/or discharge to waters of the Mekong River by any 
riparian state, the party(ies) concerned shall determine all relevant fac-
tors, the cause, extent of damage and responsibility for damages caused 
by that State in conformity with principles of international law relating 
to state responsibility.252
Under Articles 7 and 8 there is no reference to the principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilisation. It is therefore unclear how these provisions relate to the 
previous requirements, both in Article 7 itself, ‘to make every effort to avoid, 
minimise and mitigate harmful effects that might occur to the environment’, 
and the obligation in Article 5 to utilise the waters of the Mekong River sys-
tem in an equitable and reasonable manner. In sum, the UN Watercourses 
Convention and the UNECE Water Convention could assist in the interpreta-
tion of the Mekong Agreement by clearly stipulating the relationship between 
the principles of equitable and reasonable utilisation, and no significant harm.
252   The ILC considered the threshold of ‘substantial’ to be higher than that of ‘significant.’ 
The ILC commented that, ‘[w]hile such an effect must be capable of being established 
by objective evidence and not be trivial in nature, it need not rise to the level of being 
substantial’, at 94.
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(d) The Protection of Ecosystems
A further feature of the UN Watercourses Convention, the UNECE Water 
Convention and the Mekong Agreement relates to ecosystem protection and 
sustainable development.
The Mekong Agreement recognises the importance of developing the basin 
in a sustainable manner multiple times—in its title, preamble and objectives. 
The agreement also stipulates that the parties must, ‘protect the environ-
ment, natural resources, aquatic life and conditions, and ecological balance 
of the Mekong River Basin from pollution or other harmful effects resulting 
from any development plans and uses of water and related resources in the 
Basin.’253 Moreover, states are obliged to maintain flows of the mainstream of 
the Mekong River Basin—although the extent to which such flows are to sat-
isfy ecosystem needs is not clearly stated.
The UN Watercourses Convention places significant emphasis on the need 
to develop international watercourses in a sustainable manner. Article 5(1) 
stipulates that states should, when determining what is equitable and reason-
able, aim towards, ‘attaining optimal and sustainable utilisation thereof, and 
benefits therefrom’ an international watercourse, ‘consistent with adequate 
protection of the watercourse.’ The need to protect the watercourse is stressed 
again in Article 5(2), which obliges states to, ‘participate in the . . . protection 
of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner.’254 
Furthermore, Article 20 of the UN Watercourses Convention obliges water-
course states to, ‘protect and preserve the ecosystems of international 
watercourses.’255
The UNECE Water Convention obliges states to take all appropriate mea-
sures, ‘to ensure that transboundary waters are used with the aim of ecologically 
253   Art. 3, Mekong Agreement.
254   Art. 6 stipulates that the parties agree:
   “To cooperate in the maintenance of the flows on the mainstream from diversions, 
storage releases, or other actions of a permanent nature; except in the cases of historically 
severe droughts and/or floods:
   A. Of not less than the acceptable minimum monthly natural flow during each month 
of the dry season;
   B. To enable the acceptable natural reverse flow of the Tonle Sap to take place during 
the wet season; and,
   C. To prevent average daily peak flows greater than what naturally occur on the aver-
age during the flood season.”
255   See also Art. 21 on prevention, reduction and control of pollution; Art. 22 on the intro-
duction of alien or new species; and Art. 23 on protection and preservation of the marine 
environment.
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sound and rational water management, conservation of water resources and 
environmental protection’; and ‘to ensure conservation and, where neces-
sary, restoration of ecosystems.’256 In addition, the UNECE Water Convention 
requires states to take into account the precautionary principle, the polluter-
pays principle, and intergenerational equity, in determining taking appropri-
ate measure to prevent, control and reduce transboundary impact.257
In placing particular emphasis on the need to protect the environment 
or ecosystem of an international watercourse, each of the three instruments 
might therefore be seen as complementary. Moreover, a combined reading of 
their text might help strengthen the extent to which ecosystems needs and 
interests are weighed up against each other when applying the principle of 
equitable and reasonable utilisation.
III Procedural Aspects
Procedural mechanisms are critical to the implementation of the substantive 
norms that are contained within the Mekong Agreement, the UN Watercourses 
Convention and the UNECE Water Convention.258
These procedural requirements are founded upon a general obligation to 
cooperate, which is expressed in the Mekong Agreement, the UN Watercourses 
Convention and the UNECE Water Convention.259 The three instruments 
also contain more specific procedural requirements relating to notification 
and consultation and data and information exchange.
The Mekong Agreement, the UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE 
Water Convention all place states under an obligation to notify and consult 
with each other concerning planned measures. However, there are notable 
differences between the three instruments. In terms of who to notify, the UN 
Watercourses Convention limits this to other watercourse states that may suf-
fer a significant adverse effect from a planned measure.260 Conversely, the 
Mekong Agreement simply requires notification to take place via the Joint 
Committee, which includes representatives from the four lower Mekong 
states.261 Similarly, the UNECE Water Convention obliges states to establish 
256   Art. 2(2)(B) & (D), UNECE Water Convention.
257   Art. (2)(5).
258   McIntyre, supra note 53.
259   Art. 4, Mekong Agreement, Art. 8, UN Watercourses Convention, and Art. 9, UNECE Water 
Convention. See also C. Leb, Cooperation in the Law of Transboundary Water Resources 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013).
260   Art. 12, UN Watercourses Convention.
261   Chapter II, Mekong Agreement.
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joint bodies, which inter alia, ‘serve as a forum for the exchange of information 
on existing and planned uses of water and related institutions that are likely to 
cause transboundary impact.’262
The timing of notification is addressed both in the UN Watercourses 
Convention and the Mekong Agreement, with both instruments requiring that 
such notification be ‘timely.’263 Any notification should also be accompanied 
with sufficient data and information in order for other states to evaluate the 
potential effect of the measure.
The UN Watercourses Convention requires the planning state to share, 
‘available technical data and information, including the results of any envi-
ronmental impact assessment.’264 A similar requirement is contained in the 
Mekong Agreement, which in the case of prior consultation, requires states to 
provide, ‘data and information . . . that would allow the other member ripar-
ians to discuss and evaluate the impact of the proposed use upon their uses of 
water and any other affects.’265 While the UNECE Water Convention does not 
explicitly cover the type of data and information that a notifying state should 
exchange, it does stipulate that any joint bodies established by the parties 
should, ‘participate in the implementation of environmental impact assess-
ments relating to transboundary waters, in accordance with appropriate inter-
national regulations.’266
Having notified and exchanged relevant data and information, the UN 
Watercourses Convention then provides a period of six months for potentially 
affected states to respond to the notifying state.267 Pursuant to the Convention, 
262   Art. 9(2)(h), UNECE Water Convention. For UNECE States, the UNECE Water Convention 
is also complemented by the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment within 
a Transboundary Context (1991) (Espoo Convention). The ESPOO Convention sets out 
detailed requirements by which states must notify and consult on planned measures, and 
also contact transboundary Environmental Impact Assessments.
263   Art. 12, UN Watercourses Convention; Chapter II, Mekong Agreement.
264   Art. 12, UN Watercourses Convention. This requirement to provide an Environmental 
Impact Assessment ‘if available’ could be interpreted two ways. Firstly, it might suggest 
that it is at the discretion of the notifying state whether or not to provide an environmen-
tal impact assessment. Secondly, and more likely in light of subsequent developments in 
customary international law, it can be argued that an environmental impact assessment, 
which considers the transboundary aspects of any development, is a due diligence obliga-
tion upon all states (see supra note 264). However, as noted in the Pulp Mills Case (supra 
note 62), notification may well precede the environmental impact assessment process.
265   Chapter II, Mekong Agreement.
266   Art. 9(2)(J), UNECE Water Convention.
267   Art. 13(a), UN Watercourses Convention.
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this period may be extended by a further six months if a notified state has 
‘special difficulty’ in evaluating the project within the initial six months.268 
During the six- or 12-month period, the notifying state is obliged not to, ‘imple-
ment or permit the implementation of the planned measures without the 
consent of the notified State.’269 If the states in question fail to agree on 
the best way forward during the notification period, they are required under the 
UN Watercourses Convention to enter into consultations and negotiations 
with a view to reaching an equitable resolution of the situation.270 During the 
negotiation and consultation period, the notifying state must, unless agreed 
otherwise, refrain from implementing the planned measure for a period of 
six months.271
Within the Mekong context, an attempt to provide additional guidance 
related to notification and consultation resulted in the adoption of the PNPCA, 
which were signed by the MRC Council members in 2003.272 The PNPCA were 
complemented by Guidelines on Implementation of the PNPCA Guidelines, 
which were signed by members of the MRC Joint Committee.273 The PNPCA pro-
vide both the content and form that notification and prior consultation should 
take; that the consultation period should be six months and extended if neces-
sary; and the procedures also set out the roles and responsibilities of the MRC 
National Mekong Committees, Joint Committee and Secretariat throughout 
the process.274 For both notification and prior consultation, prescribed forms 
are set out in the annex of the PNPCA. These forms require the states planning 
a project to provide: the name of the project, location and nature of the pro-
posed project; the purpose of the proposed use; expected dates for construction 
and starting operation; and key documents, including a summary of a feasibil-
ity study and an initial environmental evaluation.275 The PNPCA Guidelines go 
further in a number of key areas, including the timing of notification, roles and 
responsibilities and the data and information that should be shared. However, 
while the PNPCA and PNPCA Guidelines are largely consistent with the 
UN Watercourses Convention, it is questionable as to whether they are legally 
268   Art. 13(b), UN Watercourses Convention.
269   Art. 13(b), UN Watercourses Convention.
270   Art. 17, UN Watercourses Convention.
271   Art. 17(3), UN Watercourses Convention.
272   PNPCA Procedures supra note 190.
273   Supra note 193.
274   PNPCA Procedures supra note 190.
275   Ibid.
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binding.276 Moreover, the UN Watercourses Convention provides additional 
details on what happens if the states fail to agree following the consultation 
process. Notification and consultation procedures is therefore an area where 
the Mekong Agreement might benefit from the more detailed and legally bind-
ing requirements of the UN Watercourses Convention.277
Closely aligned to the requirement to notify and consult is the more gen-
eral requirement that states exchange data and information relating to their 
international watercourses. Both global water conventions place states under 
an obligation to exchange such data and information. The UN Watercourses 
Convention requires parties to exchange, ‘on a regular basis, data and informa-
tion concerning, ‘the condition of the watercourse, in particular that of a hydro-
logical, meteorological, hydrogeological and ecological nature and related to 
the water quality as well as related forecasts.’278 Watercourse states are also 
compelled, upon a request from another state, to share data and informa-
tion that is not readily available. In such circumstances, data and information 
might be shared on the condition that the requesting state covers reasonable 
costs associated with gathering the data and information.279 However, data 
and information that is vital to a state’s ‘national defence or security’ can be 
excluded from this general obligation to exchange data and information.280
The UNECE Water Convention provides a general requirement that par-
ties, ‘provide for the widest exchange of information’, and to do so, ‘as early as 
possible.’281 More specific requirements are placed on riparian parties, who are 
obligated to exchange data and information on matters including: the environ-
mental conditions of transboundary waters; experience gained in the applica-
tion and operation of best available technology and results of research and 
development; emission and monitoring data; measures taken and planned 
to be taken to prevent, control and reduce transboundary impact; national 
276   Supra note 194.
277   R. Kinna, ‘UN Watercourses Convention: Can It Revitalise the Mekong Agreement 
20 Years On?’ Mekong Commons, 24 November 2015, http://www.mekongcommons.org/
un-watercourses-convention-can-it-revitalise-mekong-agreement-20-years-on (accessed 
5 December 2016); R. Kinna, R., ‘An Alternate Past/Future for Mekong River Dams under 
the UN Watercourses Convention (Parts 1, 2 and 3), Global Water Forum, 4 April 2016, 
Global Water Forum, http://www.globalwaterforum.org/2016/04/04/an-alternate-past-
future-for-mekong-river-dams-under-the-un-watercourses-convention-part-1 (accessed 
5 December 2016).
278   Art. 9, UN Watercourses Convention.
279   Art. 9(2), UN Watercourses Convention.
280   Art. 31, UN Watercourses Convention.
281   Art. 6, UNECE Water Convention.
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regulations relating to emission limits; and permits or regulations for waste-
water discharges issued by a competent authority or appropriate body.282 
Along similar lines to the UN Watercourses Convention, the UNECE Water 
Convention provides that a riparian party may request another riparian party 
to provide data and information that is not available; and such a request may 
be conditioned that the requesting party pay reasonable costs for security of 
that data or information.283 However, the UNECE Water Convention and the 
UN Watercourses Convention do differ slightly in the type of data and infor-
mation that might be protected. As well as protecting data and information 
related to ‘national security’, the UNECE Water Convention also protects data 
and information, ‘related to industrial and commercial secrecy, including intel-
lectual security.’284 This condition is slightly tempered by the requirement in 
the UNECE Water Convention that riparian parties, ‘facilitate the exchange 
of best available technology, particularly through the promotion of the com-
mercial exchange of available technology; direct industrial contacts and coop-
eration, including joint ventures; the exchange of information and experience; 
and the provision of technical assistance.285
The Mekong Agreement does not dedicate a specific provision to data and 
information exchange. However, a task of the Joint Committee is, ‘[t]o regu-
larly obtain, update and exchange information and data necessary’ to the 
implement the Agreement. Additionally, Procedures for Data and Information 
Exchange and Sharing were signed by the members of the MRC Council on 1st 
of November 2001.286 The procedures provide that the data and information to 
be shared between the parties should include that relating to water resources, 
topography, natural resources, agriculture, navigation and transport, flood 
management and mitigation, infrastructure, urbanisation or industrialisa-
tion, environment or ecology, administrative boundaries, socio-economy, and 
tourism.287 In line with the UNECE Water Convention, both data and informa-
tion relating to national defence or security, and that of a commercially sen-
sitive nature, is exempt from the general principle of data and information 
282   Art. 13(1), UNECE Water Convention.
283   Art. 13(3), UNECE Watercourses Convention.
284   Art. 8, UNECE Water Convention.
285   Art. 13(4), UNECE Water Convention.
286   Supra note 188.
287   Section 4, supra note 188.
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exchange.288 The procedures also provide that costs for collecting data and 
information should be borne by the requesting party.289
As with the PNPCA and their Guidelines, the Procedures on data and infor-
mation exchange and sharing go some way to address the gaps in the Mekong 
Agreement related to data and information, although the question over the 
legal status still remains.290 The UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE 
Water Convention, if the Mekong states were to become party, would therefore 
strengthen the requirement for data and information exchange.
The UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE Water Convention con-
tain a number of additional procedural mechanisms that might strengthen the 
implementation of the Mekong Agreement.
The UNECE Water Convention requires riparian parties to, ‘implement joint 
programmes for monitoring the conditions of transboundary waters, including 
floods and ice drifts, as well as transboundary impact.’291 In so doing, parties 
are obliged to agree upon pollution parameters and pollutants, which must 
be regularly monitored.292 Riparian parties are also obliged to conduct ‘joint 
or coordinated assessments of the conditions of transboundary waters and 
the effectiveness of measures taken for the prevention, control and reduction 
of transboundary impact.’293 A further requirement under the UNECE Water 
Convention is that riparian parties, ‘harmonise rules for the setting up and 
operation of monitoring programmes, measurement systems, devices, analyti-
cal techniques, data processing and evaluation procedures, and methods for 
the registration of pollutants discharged.’294
As well as requirements related to monitoring and assessment, the UNECE 
Water Convention obliges riparian states to make publicly available, ‘informa-
tion on the conditions of transboundary waters, measures taken or planned 
to be taken to prevent, control and reduce transboundary impact, and the 
effectiveness of those measures.’295 While the UNECE Water Convention does 
not contain a similar provision, it does refer to a right of ‘persons, natural or 
juridical’ to seek access to justice in a foreign court if they have, ‘suffered or are 
288   Section 4, supra note 188.
289   Section 4, supra note 188.
290   Supra note 194.
291   Art. 11(1), UNECE Water Convention. See also Article 4, which stipulates that, ‘[t]he Parties 
shall establish programmes for monitoring the conditions of transboundary waters.’
292   Article 11(2), UNECE Water Convention.
293   Art. 11(3), UNECE Water Convention.
294   Art. 11(4), UNECE Water Convention.
295   Art. 16, UNECE Water Convention.
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under a serious threat of suffering significant transboundary harm as a result 
of activities related to an international watercourse.’ The Mekong Agreement 
does not contain any provision relating to non-state activities.
An additional area that is covered by the UN Watercourses Convention 
and the UNECE Water Convention but not the Mekong Agreement concerns 
emergency situations. Pursuant to the UN Watercourses Convention, such 
situations include, ‘a situation that causes, or poses an imminent threat of 
causing, serious harm to watercourse states or other states and that results 
suddenly from natural causes, such as floods, the breaking up of ice, landslides 
or earthquakes, or from human conduct, such as industrial accidents.’296 Both 
the UN Watercourse Convention and the UNECE Water Convention require 
that states, ‘without delay and by the most expeditious means available’, 
notify potentially affected states or competent international organisations of 
any emergency situations arising in their territory.297 The UN Watercourses 
Convention also requires states to develop contingency plans for responding to 
such emergencies,298 and the UNECE Water Convention requires that the par-
ties, ‘operate coordinated or joint communication, warning and alarm systems 
with the aim of obtaining and transmitting information.’299
IV Institutional Arrangements
The institutional arrangements envisaged by the UN Watercourses Conven-
tion, the UNECE Water Convention and the Mekong Agreement differ between 
each legal instrument.
The UN Watercourses Convention simply provides a general recommenda-
tion that states ‘enter into consultation’, with a view to the establishment of 
‘joint management mechanisms.’300
The UNECE Water Convention goes further by requiring that riparian par-
ties establish ‘joint bodies’ related to their transboundary waters.301 While 
there is flexibility in the form that such ‘joint bodies’ might take,302 the UNECE 
Water Convention does set out a number of tasks that such bodies must per-
form, including: collecting, compiling and evaluating data in order to identify 
296   Art. 28, UN Watercourses Convention.
297   Art. 28(2), UN Watercourses Convention, and Art. 14, UNECE Water Convention.
298   Art. 28(4), UN Watercourses Convention.
299   Art. 14, UNECE Water Convention. See also Art. 15 relating to mutual assistance regarding 
emergency situations.
300   Supra note 67.
301   Art. 9(2), UNECE Water Convention.
302   Guide to Implementing the UNECE Water Convention, supra note 62, at 70–76.
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pollution sources likely to cause transboundary impact; elaborating joint 
monitoring programmes concerning water quality and quantity; drawing up 
inventories and exchanging information on the pollution sources; elaborat-
ing emission limits for waste water and evaluating the effectiveness of con-
trol programmes; elaborating joint water-quality objectives and criteria, and 
proposing relevant measures for maintaining, and where necessary, improving 
water quality; developing concerted action programmes for the reduction of 
pollution loads from point and diffuse sources; establishing early warning and 
alarm procedures; serving as a forum for exchanging information on existing 
and planned uses; promoting cooperation and exchange of information on the 
best available technology; and participating in the implementation of environ-
mental impact assessments.303
As noted previously, the Mekong Agreement sets out the international 
framework for its implementation, namely the MRC. The MRC would fall under 
the meaning of a ‘joint body’, as envisaged in the UNECE Water Convention. 
A number of tasks of the MRC are also set out in the Agreement. The functions 
of the MRC Council are described in broad terms, including making policies 
and decisions in support of implementing the Mekong Agreement, as well as 
approving rules of water utilisation, creating a basin development plan and 
establishing guidelines for financial and technical assistance for development 
projects and programmes.304 More specific functions are set out for the MRC 
Joint Committee, which include: implementing the policies and decisions of 
the MRC Council; formulating a basin development plan and obtaining finan-
cial support for it; regularly obtaining, updating and exchanging information 
and data to support the implementation of the Agreement; conducting ‘appro-
priate studies and assessments’ for protecting the ecological balance of the 
Mekong River Basin; assigning and supervising tasks of the Secretariat; seek-
ing to address and resolve any differences between the parties; reviewing and 
approving studies and training for personnel of each riparian party; and mak-
ing recommendations to the Council on the organisational structure of the 
Secretariat.305 The Secretariat itself is afforded the following functions under 
the Agreement: carrying out decision and tasks assigned by the Council and 
Joint Committee; providing technical and financial administration and advice 
to the Council and Joint Committee; formulating a work programme and other 
plans, projects, programme documents, studies and assessments as required; 
assisting the Joint Committee in the implementation and management of 
303   Art. 9(2)(a)–(j), UNECE Water Convention.
304   Art. 18, Mekong Agreement.
305   Art. 24, Mekong Agreement.
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projects and programmes; maintaining a database of information; and making 
preparations for sessions of the Council and Joint Committee.306
Comparing the task of joint bodies under the UNECE Water Convention 
and the functions of the MRC shows some differences. The functions of the 
MRC Council, Joint Committee and Secretariat are, pursuant to the Mekong 
Agreement, more general in nature. Conversely, the UNECE Water Convention 
envisaged a number of more specific tasks that joint bodies must perform, 
including supporting environmental impact assessment processing, develop-
ing concerted action programmes on pollution prevention, setting joint water-
quality objectives and criteria, and establishing joint monitoring programmes. 
In practice, a number of these tasks have been conducted by the MRC. A ques-
tion could therefore be raised over whether including more specific and legally 
binding commitments related to the tasks of the MRC would be advantageous.
V Dispute Settlement
The final area of comparison between the three legal instruments relates to 
dispute settlement mechanisms. Again, there are considerable differences 
between each instrument.
The UN Watercourses Convention has the most detailed provision relating 
to dispute settlement. In the event of a dispute, the parties in question shall 
first seek to settle their dispute by negotiation, good offices, mediation and 
conciliation through a joint watercourse institution, arbitration or the ICJ.307 
If, after six months, the dispute remains unresolved, then one or both parties 
can submit the dispute to an impartial third-party ‘fact-finding commission.’308 
The fact-finding commission is charged with investigating the facts of the dis-
pute and coming up with a recommendation on how the dispute might be 
resolved in an equitable manner.309 States are obliged to consider the recom-
mendation of the third-party fact-finding commission in good faith but are not 
obligated to implement it.310 That the UN Watercourses Convention obliges 
parties to a dispute to submit to an independent fact-finding commission 
is crucial to its objective of resolution, as it effectively takes the facts of the 
dispute out of the vested interests of those states involved and places them 
in an open and transparent sphere for independent investigation, evaluation 
and finally, recommendations. As noted earlier, in the absence of meaningful 
306   Art. 30, Mekong Agreement.
307   Art. 33(2), UN Watercourses Convention.
308   Art. 33(3), UN Watercourses Convention.
309   Art. 33(8), UN Watercourses Convention.
310   Art. 33(8), UN Watercourses Convention.
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cooperation and good faith between the disputing states, ultimately the direct 
involvement of an independent third party in dispute settlement on a case-by-
case basis may be critical to the resolution of any watercourse dispute.311
The UNECE Water Convention provides a more general requirement that 
parties settle their disputes, ‘by negotiation or by any other means of dispute 
settlement acceptable to the parties of the dispute.’312 When becoming party 
to the Convention, or at any time thereafter, states may also declare that if dis-
putes are not resolved through negotiation or other means, the dispute will be 
submitted to the ICJ or arbitration.313 Under the UNECE Water Convention, 
the parties have established the Implementation Committee—an additional 
means by which to resolve, or even avoid, disputes.314 Established in 2012, 
the Implementation Committee has the objective of being a mechanism, ‘to 
facilitate, promote and safeguard the implementation and application of and 
compliance with the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes.’315 Additionally, the nature of the com-
mittee is described as being, ‘simple, non-confrontational, non-adversarial, 
transparent, supportive and cooperative.’316 Nine members, serving in their 
individual capacity and nominated by states, sit on the Implementation 
Committee. There is a mixture of both legal and scientific/technical expertise.317 
Issues may come before the Implementation Committee through a variety of 
311   Rieu-Clarke & Gooch, supra note 179, at 211.
312   Art. 22(1), UNECE Water Convention.
313   Art. 22(2), UNECE Water Convention. A procedure for arbitration is set out in annex IV of 
the UNECE Water Convention.
314   UNECE, Decision VI/! Support to Implementation and Compliance, UN Doc. ECE/
MP.WAT/37/Add.2.
315   Ibid., Annex I(1).
316   Ibid., Annex I(2).
317   The members of the committee for 2015–2018 are Ms Vanya Grigoriova, Executive 
Director of the Executive Environment Agency of the Ministry of Environment and Water 
in Bulgaria; Mr Kari Kinnunen, Director of the Lapland Regional Environmental Centre; 
Professor Lammars, Professor of Public International Law and former advisor to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands; Professor Stephen McCaffrey, Distinguished 
Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, California; Ms Anne 
Schulte-Wülwer-Leidig, Deputy Head of the Secretariat of the International Commission 
for the Protection of the Rhine; Mr Allaksandr Stankevich, Head of the Republican 
Centre for Radiation Control and Environmental Monitoring in Belarus; Professor 
Attila Tanzi, Professor of International Law, University of Bologna; Mr Ivan Zavadsky, 
Secretary of the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River; and 
Ms Dinara Ziganshina, Deputy Director of the Scientific Information Centre of Interstate 
Commission for Water Cooperation in Central Asia.
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means, including by submission of a party or parties or by the Committee 
becoming aware of possible difficulties faced by a party or parties in imple-
menting or complying with the Convention.318 After investigating the issue 
and consulting with the party or parties concerned, the Implementation 
Committee has a number of measures at its disposal to support implementa-
tion and compliance. The Committee may: provide advice and facilitate assis-
tance to individual parties and groups of parties; request and assist a party or 
parties to develop an action plan to facilitate implementation of and compli-
ance with the Convention; and invite a party to submit progress reports to the 
Committee on efforts taken to comply with the Convention.319 The Committee 
may also recommend to the Meeting of the Parties to the Convention a num-
ber of additional measures, including the provision of financial and technical 
assistance, training and other capacity-building measures, as well as technol-
ogy transfer. The Committee may issue a statement of concern; issue declara-
tions of non-compliance; issue cautions; suspend special rights and privileges 
accorded to a party under the Convention; or take other non-confrontational, 
non-judicial and consultative measures as appropriate.320
Under the Mekong Agreement, dispute-settlement mechanisms are limited. 
Initially, responsibility to resolve any ‘difference or dispute’ between two or 
more parties to the Mekong Agreement rests with the MRC Joint Committee 
and the MRC Council.321 Failing resolution via the Joint Committee and 
Council, the parties are obliged to resolve the dispute, ‘by negotiation through 
diplomatic challenges within a timely manner’, and where necessary or ben-
eficial, with, ‘the assistance of mediation through an entity or party mutually 
agreed upon.’322 The sum legal effect of the above provision is one of a gener-
ally non-binding and circular ‘stop gap’ procedure whereby the MRC and state 
parties to the dispute must all utilize these legally ‘vague and incomplete pro-
cedures on what steps should be taken to provide remedies.’323 It is under-
standable, then, that dispute resolution under the existing Mekong Agreement 
provisions has generally proven to be quite ‘convoluted and often protracted, 
as illustrated in the aftermath of the Yali Falls dam.’324
318   Annex I, sections V–VII, supra note 314.
319   Annex I, section XI, supra note 314.
320   Annex I, section XI, supra note 314.
321   Art. 34, Mekong Agreement.
322   Art. 35, Making Agreement.
323   Bearden, supra note 135, at 815.
324   Bearden et al., supra note 120, at 187.
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Dispute settlement is therefore another area where the UN Watercourses 
Convention and the UNECE Water Convention might assist in providing addi-
tional options and detail by which states can settle their disputes peacefully. In 
particular, the role of third parties as envisaged in both the UN Watercourses 
Convention and the UNECE Water Convention may prove more effective in 
resolving disputes. The significance of providing for specific, yet multiple, 
options for third-party dispute settlement is that the two global water conven-
tions recognize that ultimately a dispute may not be able to be resolved via the 
cooperative efforts and good faith of the parties to the dispute alone.
A further benefit of the UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE Water 
Convention is that they provide relatively detailed procedures, which clearly 
define the expectations within each of the sequential steps and different 
forums involved in resolving a dispute. In particular, the framework, standards 
and processes for the establishment and functioning of an independent fact-
finding commission under the UN Watercourses Convention or the UNECE 
Water Convention Implementation Committee is fundamental to the overall 
dispute resolution procedures insofar as they clearly seek to demonstrate and 
maintain the impartiality of this forum and its recommendations. Additionally, 
the fact that the Annex to both conventions provides detailed standards and 
processes for the establishment, function and any award of an arbitral tribunal 
complements the above and further strengthens the overall legal framework 
for dispute resolution found within both Conventions. That Article 33 of the 
UN Watercourses Convention specifies the relevant timeframes between and 
within each of its relevant procedural steps is in stark contrast to the Mekong 
Agreement. That the Mekong Agreement refers only to ‘within a timely man-
ner’ yet does not define its legal interpretation severely impacts its practical 
application within each of the already ambiguous process and undoubtedly 
leaves significant scope for varying interpretations, which can thus cause con-
fusion and ultimately exacerbate tensions within a dispute.
Finally, the lack of any legal remedy for private citizens to seek recourse 
and pursue liability for harm originating in another watercourse state is also 
notably absent from the Mekong Agreement. Certainly, the principle of non-
discrimination encapsulated in Article 32 of the UN Watercourses Convention 
is a notable inclusion as all of the other provisions within both instruments 
relate to disputes between states.325
325   For further analysis of the principle of non-discrimination as it applies under the 
UN Watercourses Convention, such as in the context of transboundary river pollution, 
see generally: R. Kinna, ‘Non-discrimination and Liability for Transboundary Acid Mine 
 59the governance regime of the mekong river basin
INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW 2.1 (2017) 1–84
C Can the UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE Water 
Convention Assist in Strengthening Governance in the Mekong  
and Beyond?
I Becoming a Party to the UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE 
Water Convention Would Be the Most Politically Feasible Option
Widespread support for global conventions can often be stifled by a general 
reluctance on the part of states to cede any national sovereignty to the inter-
national realm. Nevertheless, as Hirsch maintains, ‘[a]ny legal framework 
developed to govern issues of sovereignty, redress, environmental regulation, 
financing arrangements and a host of other questions associated with large 
dams needs to go well beyond the limited arena of national law.’326
A common misconception of the global water conventions is that they 
impinge upon the national sovereignty of riparian states by restricting their 
ability to govern uses of international watercourses falling within their domes-
tic jurisdictions. Rather, the function of the global water conventions is to go 
beyond but not usurp national sovereignty by facilitating cooperation in a 
manner that produces greater benefits than unilateral action can offer, and 
by addressing gaps in the effective governance of international watercourses.327 
Whilst the conventions address basic substantive and procedural matters, they 
leave much of the detail to watercourse states themselves to negotiate and 
agree upon.328 Salman goes on to ably summarise the legal mandate provided 
under the UN Watercourses Convention to those basin states which become 
parties to it, whereby:
The provisions of the Convention on those basic matters reflect a com-
promising language that takes into account the interests and concerns 
of all riparian states. The Convention calls for cooperation on the basis 
of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and mutual benefit in order to 
attain optimal utilization of the international watercourse for the pres-
ent and future generations, thus laying the general framework for mutu-
ally beneficial utilization by all the riparians.329
Drainage Pollution of South Africa’s Rivers: Could the UN Watercourses Convention Open 
Pandora’s Mine?’ 41(3) Water International (2016) 371–391.
326   Hirsch, supra note 137, at 414.
327   UNECE, Policy Guidance Note on the Benefits of Transboundary Water Cooperation—
Identification, Assessment and Communication, 2015, UN Doc. ECE/MP.Wat/47.
328   Salman, supra note 29, at 14.
329   Salman, supra note 29, at 14.
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Hence, the global water conventions adopt a framework approach and pos-
sess unique legal capacity to address gaps and, in turn, improve the overall 
governance of international watercourses. Moreover, it is clear from the 
above points that not only would the global water conventions protect as 
well as strengthen the existing rights and duties of the MRC member states, 
but as regards national sovereignty, ratification would not represent an addi-
tional burden on MRC states. Rather, it would assist in the interpretation and 
implementation of commitments that they have already entered into as a mat-
ter of either customary international law or treaty law, including the Mekong 
Agreement.330
The MRC has up to now maintained its status as a well-funded institu-
tion, albeit one which relies upon donor governments for its funding. Yet, 
almost since its inception, donors have called for greater transparency within 
the processes and decision-making of the MRC, especially in relation to its 
actions under the prior notification and informed consent obligations under 
the Mekong Agreement.331 Indeed, the MRC review of the PNPCA and their 
Guidelines was in response to donors seeking clarification of the processes and 
timeframes that were disputed elements between member states stemming 
from the Xayaburi Dam project in Laos.332 Subsequently, this same donor query 
has been raised in relation to the only other mainstream dam to fall under the 
PNPCA process—namely the Don Sahong Dam, which is under construction 
in Lao.333 These challenges faced by the MRC offer a window of opportunity 
to reconsider the value of states joining the two global water conventions, as a 
means of strengthening the implementation of the Mekong Agreement.
Previous legal analyses that compared the Mekong Agreement and its 
accompanying procedures against contemporary developments in the law 
relating to international watercourses, including the UN Watercourses Conven-
tion and the UNECE Water Convention, have overwhelmingly recommended 
330   Radosevich and Olson, supra note 3; S. Pech, UN Watercourses Convention and the Greater 
Mekong Sub-region, July 2011, http://www.unwatercoursesconvention.org/images/2012/10/
Mekong-and-UNWC.pdf (accessed 28 November 2016), at 51.
331   See for example, MRC, Joint Development Partner Statement, 24 June 2015, http://www 
.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/speeches/joint-development-partner-statement-
24-june-2015 (accessed 9 December 2016); Van Duyen, supra note 117, at 370.
332   Ibid.; A. Rieu-Clarke, ‘Notification and Consultation on Planned Measures Concerning 
International Watercourses: Lessons from the Pulp Mills and Kishenganga Cases’, 24(1) 
Yearbook of International Environmental Law (2014) 102–130, at 103.
333   S. Turton, ‘Mekong Body Risks Losing Funds: Donors’, 25 June 2015, The Phnom Penh Post.
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that the Agreement be strengthened.334 However, the majority of these studies 
were conducted when the UN Watercourses Convention did not look like it 
would enter into force, and the global relevance of the UNECE Water Conven-
tion was not fully appreciated. Moreover, at the time, no Mekong states had 
taken any concrete steps to become a party to either Convention, and indeed, 
one state (China) had voted against the UN Watercourses Convention. Rather 
than explore the value of the Conventions, it appeared opportune to advocate 
for an amendment or re-negotiation of the basin instrument in order to raise 
the legal standards, clarifying processes and strengthening implementation 
of the Mekong Agreement.335 Bearden, for instance, maintained that:
Although the Mekong legal regime is a viable institutional framework 
evidencing long-term interstate cooperation during periods of con-
flict, it requires amendments to achieve holistic management of water 
resources. With amendments, the Mekong legal regime can provide a 
future pathway for effective transboundary water governance of one of 
Southeast Asia’s largest and most important international watercourses.336
An alternative strategy that was put forward was to advocate for a protocol to 
the agreement, which at the time was consider ‘more politically achievable’, 
‘[g]iven the Agreement’s history’ and because, ‘it may be difficult to change the 
substance of the Agreement itself.’337
However, revising the text or concluding an additional protocol would be 
extremely ambitious given the length of time and political capital required. 
Amending the existing provisions may not even achieve the intended outcome. 
Furthermore, the non-binding and somewhat convoluted nature of the key 
procedures and guidelines which were elaborated under the agreement, most 
notably the PNPCA framework, have led to some confusion between states 
regarding agreed-upon processes and timelines for notification and informed 
334   Hirsch, supra note 137; Hirsch, et al., supra note 5; Bearden, supra note 135; Bearden, 
et al., supra note 18; A. Rieu-Clarke, ‘Notification and Consultation Procedures Under 
the Mekong Agreement: Insights from the Xayaburi Controversy’, 5(1) Asian Journal of 
International Law (2015) 143–175; Rieu-Clarke & Gooch, supra note 179; Van Duyen, supra 
note 117; Pech, supra note 330.
335   Bearden, supra note 135, at 815; Van Duyen, supra note 117, at 376; Pech, supra note 330.
336   Bearden, supra note 135, at 799.
337   Hirsch, et al., supra note 5, at 5. See also Bearden, supra note 135, at 815; Van Duyen, supra 
note 117, at 374 & 376.
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consent. This confusion was demonstrated in the cases of the Xayaburi and 
Don Sahong projects—the first two projects that have gone through the prior 
consultation procedures.338 With Lao having now submitted its third dam—
Pak Beng—on the Mekong River mainstream to the MRC for prior consulta-
tion under the PNPCA and PNPCA Guidelines, the MRC claims it has learnt 
from the two previous prior consultation processes, yet others claim key pro-
cedural aspects of the PNPCA from those two dams still remain, to a certain 
extent, unclear.339
If the states of the Mekong were to become party to the UN Watercourses 
Convention and the UNECE Water Convention, it would be a more achievable 
means by which to ensure that customary international law was applied evenly 
across all of the MRC member states, as well as the basin more broadly, includ-
ing China and Myanmar. Without having to sacrifice the overriding purpose 
and inherent ‘Mekong Spirit’ of the Mekong Agreement, MRC states could join 
the UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE Water Convention—and as 
a result, not have to amend the Mekong Agreement. Finally, and most critically, 
joining the two global water conventions would not represent any additional 
burden on the MRC countries, given the advanced stage of water-related coop-
eration that exists within the region.340 Rather, as noted above, it would simply 
be a means by which to clarify and enhance the effective implementation of 
previous commitments that the states have entered into pursuant to custom-
ary international law and the Mekong Agreement.
Encouraging states of the Mekong region to join the UN Watercourses 
Convention and the UNECE Water Convention could build upon a growing 
interest and support for these two global water conventions within the region. 
Vietnam’s accession to the UN Watercourses Convention might be seen in 
light of a broader effort to raise awareness and promote the benefits of both 
338   See Rieu-Clarke, supra note 334; I.C. Campbell, ‘Integrated Management in the Mekong 
River Basin, 16(4) Ecohydrology & Hydrobiology (2016) 252–262; P. Hirsch, ‘The 
Shifting Regional Geopolitics of Mekong Dams’, 51 Political Geography (2016) 63–74; 
O. Hensengerth, ‘Where is the Power? Transnational Networks, Authority and the Dispute 
over the Xayaburi Dam on the Lower Mekong Mainstream’, 40 Water International (2015) 
911–928.
339   MRC, ‘Lao PDR Is to Undertake MRC’s Prior Consultation on Its New Hydropower 
Development plan in Pak Beng’ 7 November 2016, http://www.mrcmekong.org/news- 
and-events/news/mrc-statement-on-the-occasion-of-pdies-15th-anniversary-2 (accessed 
5 December 2016); M. Harris ‘Laos Dam Projects Put Entire Region at Risk’ Bangkok Post, 
17 November 2016, http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/1137161/laos-dam-
projects-put-entire-region-at-risk (accessed 5 December 2016).
340   Radosevich & Olson, supra note 3; Pech, supra note 334, at 51.
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global water conventions within the Mekong Region. Previous awareness-rais-
ing and technical capacity-building workshops on the role and relevance of 
the UN Watercourses Convention were conducted in 2012 by the WWF, Green 
Cross, the University of Dundee and Hatfield Consultants, first in Cambodia 
(at the national and regional levels), then in Vietnam.341 Individually and col-
lectively, participants were unanimous in stating that the awareness of the UN 
Watercourses Convention must be improved for there to be any possibility for 
ratification by the MRC member states.342 Participants also called for further 
awareness-raising forums and in-depth technical support, together with the 
broad dissemination of relevant studies, and a cost-benefit analysis for states 
that become party to the UN Watercourses Convention.343
These workshops have since been built upon by those conducted in 2015 
with the governments of Lao, Thailand and Cambodia. In addition, the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the NGO 
Forum on Cambodia conducted a workshop on the two global water con-
ventions for the Cambodian National Mekong Committee, government 
officials and lawyers, as well as a one-day briefing for members of the Third 
Commission of the National Assembly, in Phnom Penh, September 2015. This 
led to a co-organised WWF, IUCN, Oxfam, Conservation International and 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) workshop in 
Phnom Penh in December 2015 focusing specifically on the relevance of the 
two global water conventions to Cambodia and its steps to accession. Several 
key studies have also been produced in order to investigate the role, relevance 
and application of the UN Watercourses Convention within the lower Mekong 
Basin: in 2012 by Hatfield Consultants examining the ‘Relevance of the UNWC 
in the Greater Mekong Sub-region’; and in March 2016 a comparative legal 
analysis conducted by Transboundary Water Law (TWL) Global Consulting 
for IUCN entitled, ‘A Window of Opportunity for the Mekong Basin: The UN 
Watercourses Convention as a Basis for Cooperation (A Legal analysis of How 
the UN Watercourses Convention Complements the Mekong Agreement).’344 
341   See UN Watercourses Convention Online User’s Guide, ‘South and East Asia.’ http://
www.unwatercoursesconvention.org/global-relevance/south-and-east-asia (accessed 
28 November 2016).
342   WWF UNWC Summary Regional Workshop, 2012, http://www.unwatercoursesconvention 
.org/global-relevance/south-and-east-asia (accessed 28 November 2016).
343   WWF UNWC Summary Regional Workshop, 2012, http://www.unwatercoursesconvention 
.org/global-relevance/south-and-east-asia (accessed 28 November 2016), at 17.
344   Pech, supra note 330; IUCN. ‘A Window of Opportunity for the Mekong Basin: The 
UN Watercourses Convention as a Basis for Cooperation (A Legal analysis of How the UN 
Watercourses Convention Complements the Mekong Agreement)’ 2016, https://www 
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With the 20th anniversary of the Mekong Agreement, these events and studies 
have been accompanied by NGOs and expert commentators calling for states 
to examine the added benefit of the UN Watercourses Convention to water 
governance in the Mekong River Basin, particularly regarding evaluation, con-
sultation and negotiation processes for hydropower dams.345
Mekong states have also made an active contribution to the work of 
the UNECE Water Convention. For example, the MRC has contributed to the 
UNECE’s Policy Guidance Note on the Benefits of Transboundary Water 
Cooperation,346 and the work on Water and Climate Change Adaptation in 
Transboundary Basins.347 Representatives from the Mekong states have also 
attended key meetings of the UNECE Water Convention, including the last 
meeting of the parties in Budapest, Hungary, November 2015.348
While more needs to be done to consider the benefits of the two conven-
tions within the Mekong Region, as well as to raise awareness and secure the 
.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/import/downloads/iucn_bridge_unwc_mra_comparison.pdf 
(accessed on 17 August 2016).
345   R. Kinna, ‘UN Watercourses Convention: Can It Revitalise the Mekong Agreement 
20 Years On?’ Mekong Commons (2015, November 24) http://www.mekongcommons.org 
/un-watercourses-convention-can-it-revitalise-mekong-agreement-20-years-on/ 
(accessed on 17 August 2016); R. Kinna, ‘An Alternate Past/Future for Mekong River 
Dams under the UN Watercourses Convention (Parts 1, 2 and 3)’ Global Water Forum. 
(2016, April 20) http://www.globalwaterforum.org/2016/04/04/an-alternate-pastfuture-
for-mekong-river-dams-under-the-un-watercourses-convention-part-1/ (accessed on 
17 August 2016); J. Brunner, ‘Why the Region Needs the UN Watercourses Convention’ 
IUCN (2015, June 24). https://www.iucn.org/news_homepage/news_by_date/?21567/Why 
-the-region-needs-the-UNWatercourses-Convention  (accessed  on  17  August  2016); 
M. Goichot, ‘UN Convention Could Help Solve Mekong Pact’s Weaknesses’ Phnom 
Penh Post (2016, January 14) http://www.phnompenhpost.com/analysis-and-op-ed/un-
conventioncould-help-solve-mekong-pacts-weaknesses (accessed on 10 August 2016); 
R. Kinna, R., Glemet & J., Brunner, ‘Reinvigorating the Mekong Spirit’ Myanmar Times 
(2015, September 29) http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/opinion/16719-reinvigorat-
ing-the-mekong-spirit.html (accessed on 17 August 2016); P. Suy, ‘Group Proposes Signing 
UN Water Pact’ Khmer Times (2015) http://www.khmertimeskh.com/news/16099/group-
proposes-signing-un-water-pact/ (accessed on 10 August 2016).
346   UNECE, Policy Guidance Note on the Benefits of Transboundary Water Cooperation—
Identification, Assessment and Communication, 2015, UN Doc. ECE/MP.Wat/47.
347   UNECE & International Network of Basin Organisations, Water and Climate Change 
Adaptation in Transboundary Basins: Lessons Learned and Good Practices, 2015, UN Doc. 
ECE/MP.WAT/45.
348   Participants in the meeting of the parties included delegates from China, Myanmar, 
Thailand, Vietnam and the Mekong River Commission Secretariat.
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commitment of the states, such an effort would be able to build on the afore-
mentioned positive momentum that strongly recognises the value that the two 
conventions can provide in supporting the implementation of the Mekong 
Agreement and ensuring that the basin is governed in an equitable and rea-
sonable manner.
II UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE Water Convention 
Support the Implementation and Interpretation of the Mekong 
Agreement, Not Replace It
The above comparative analysis of the three legal instruments highlights 
a number of areas where the UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE 
Water Convention would help reinforce, rather than replace or run contrary 
to, the intention set out in the Mekong Agreement as well as its accompanying 
procedures and guidelines.
In the use of definitions, the UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE 
Water Convention include reference to groundwater, which is not expressly 
referenced within the Mekong Agreement. Given the growing recognition of 
the importance of groundwater within the Mekong Region, drawing upon the 
UN Watercourses Convention, and the UNECE Water Convention in particular, 
would help strengthen this aspect of the Mekong Agreement.
Substantive provisions are more detailed in the UN Watercourses Convention 
compared to the Mekong Agreement, particularly in relation to the relevant fac-
tors that must be taken into account when determining what is equitable and 
reasonable. Similarly, compared to both the UN Watercourses Convention 
and the Mekong Agreement, the UNECE Water Convention provides a more 
detailed list of the appropriate measures that should be adopted when seek-
ing to prevent significant harm within a transboundary context. The way in 
which the relationship between equitable and reasonable utilisation and no 
significant harm is expressed in the two global water conventions, and the 
UN Watercourses Convention in particular, also helps to add clarity to the rela-
tionship between the substantive norms presented in the Mekong Agreement. 
Both global water conventions put particular interpretative emphasis on uses 
of an international watercourse for the protection of vital human needs and 
ecosystems, which, in turn, can help support a contemporary interpreta-
tion and implementation of the more general requirements found under the 
Mekong Agreement.
Procedural rules that are found in the UN Watercourses Convention and 
the UNECE Water Convention can also help to supplement the more general 
requirements found in the Mekong Agreement. While much of the detail 
related to notification and consultation, and the more regular exchange of data 
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and information, can be found in the procedures and guidelines adopted by 
the MRC, there is a question over the legal status of the latter instruments. If the 
lower Mekong states became parties to the UN Watercourses Convention and 
the UNECE Water Convention, they would enhance the legal status of the 
requirements of notification and prior consultation, and the regular exchange 
of data and information, as found in the procedures and guidelines. This would 
demonstrate their commitment to such procedures and add certainty to the 
requirements imposed upon states to notify and consult on planned measures. 
Additionally, becoming parties to both instruments would provide greater 
clarity over the requirements to notify and consult on planned measures that 
take place within the tributaries of the Mekong. Joining the two global water 
conventions would therefore expand the legal scope and application of key 
obligations of the Mekong Agreement insofar as the distinction between the 
Mekong mainstream and its tributaries, which is currently hindering the MRC 
in adopting a truly basin-wide approach. The UN Watercourses Convention 
and the UNECE Water Convention would also add additional clarity and detail 
as to the type of data and information that should be exchanged on a regular 
basis. Such detail is further expanded upon in the UNECE Water Convention, 
through the requirement to jointly monitor and assess the conditions of trans-
boundary waters and to make information available to the public. Both the 
UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE Water Convention would also 
add further detail in terms of the procedural requirements placed upon states 
during emergency situations. Such provisions will become increasingly rele-
vant given the impacts of climate change within the basis and the likelihood of 
more extreme weather events, such as typhoons, within the basin.349
The UNECE Water Convention’s provisions related to joint bodies could 
strengthen the mandate of the MRC by setting out, in a legally binding text, 
the key tasks of a joint body. Such tasks align well with the procedural require-
ments of the two global water conventions in terms of providing a forum for 
the exchange of information, including on planned measures, and playing a 
role in the EIA process.
Finally, the UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE Water Convention 
could reinforce the implementation of the Mekong Agreement through 
their dispute-settlement mechanisms. The UN Watercourses Convention, 
through its stepwise and time-dependent dispute-settlement mechanisms, 
would strengthen the more general requirements found in the Mekong 
Agreement. Similarly, the UNECE Water Convention and the newly established 
349   MRC, Strategic Plan 2016–2020, http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/strategies-
workprog/MRC-Stratigic-Plan-2016-2020.pdf (accessed 9 December 2016).
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Implementation Committee could act as a valuable and impartial forum by 
which states can address any issues related to the implementation of, and 
compliance with, the Mekong Agreement.
The overriding purpose of ratification by states would be to create a hybrid 
legal architecture combining both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law350 for effective gover-
nance of the Mekong River basin that goes beyond the usual dichotomy of rely-
ing primarily upon one or the other.351 In this context, ‘hard’ refers to binding 
legal frameworks set out in the UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE 
Water Convention, with their globally recognized norms as well as their bind-
ing obligations and detailed procedures; these would interlock and reinforce 
the relatively ‘soft’ and less-defined rights and obligations contained in the 
Mekong Agreement, along with its accompanying procedures and guide-
lines, which are context specific and cater to the needs and unique collective 
regional geo-political history of the lower Mekong Basin states.
III Joining the UN Watercourses and the UNECE Water Convention 
Would Strengthen the Relationship between the Mekong Agreement 
and Customary International Law
By acceding to the UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE Water 
Convention, parties to the MRC would in effect align, not amend, the Mekong 
Agreement and its related procedures and guidelines with customary interna-
tional law. As noted above, the UN Watercourses Convention is the product of 
a long drafting and negotiation process, which was aimed at surveying state 
practices and deriving key rules and principles relating to international water-
courses therefrom. The UN Watercourses Convention can therefore be said to 
be founded upon what was already considered customary international law.352 
Similarly, while going through a different evolutionary process, the key rules 
and principles of the UNECE Water Convention might also be considered to be 
reflective of customary international law.353 Therefore, a comparative analysis 
of the UN Watercourses Convention, the UNECE Water Convention and the 
350   R.R. Baxter, ‘International Law in “Her Infinite Variety” ’, 29 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly (1980) 549–566.
351   Johns et al., ‘Law and the Mekong River Basin: A Socio-Legal Research Agenda on the 
Role of Hard and Soft Law in Regulating Transboundary Water Resources’, 11(1) Melbourne 
Journal of International Law (2010) 154–174.
352   S.M.A. Salman, ‘The Helsinki Rules, The UN Watercourses Convention and the Berlin 
Rules: Perspectives on International Water Law’, 23 International Journal of Water 
Resources Development (2007) 625–640.
353   A. Tanzi, O. McIntyre & A. Kolliopoulos, ‘The Contribution of the UNECE Water 
Convention to International Water Law’, in A. Tanzi et al., (eds), The UNECE Convention 
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Mekong Agreement demonstrates that there is much to be gained from 
the Mekong states implementing these instruments via a ‘package approach.’ 
In this regard, a ‘package approach’ refers to them collectively comprising a 
suite of internationally accepted legal norms and procedures, as accepted 
under customary international law, for transboundary river governance. Hence, 
‘the similarities between both instruments on key issues such as the focus on 
international or transboundary waters, or the package of substantive norms, 
[. . .] provides a strong justification for ensuring that the conventions are pro-
moted and implemented jointly—as a”package.” ’354
In one respect, this close relationship between customary international 
law and the two global water conventions might be seen as a reason for not 
becoming party to either instrument. Why, for instance, would a state go 
through the process of treaty accession, acceptance, approval or ratification 
if—via customary international law—they are bound by the rights and obliga-
tions contained within that treaty anyway?355 A counterargument would be 
that becoming party to a convention adds clarity to inter-state relations in two 
respects.
Firstly, it could be argued that even where a rule or principle is widely 
accepted as being reflective of customary international law, the precise con-
tours of that rule or principle might not be widely understood or endorsed.356 
An example might be seen in the case of the duty to notify and consult over 
planned measures. While states might generally accept that they are under a 
due diligence obligation to notify other states of planned measures that may 
have a transboundary impact, the precise detail of that notification require-
ment may not be clear or may be interpreted differently by states. Even where 
states are not party to the UN Watercourses Convention, they would no doubt 
use that instrument as a guide in determining their commitments under cus-
tomary international law pertaining to notification and consultation. However, 
greater clarity would be gained if the states were party to the UN Watercourses 
Convention, as it would leave less discretion for states to decide which parts 
on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes—Its 
Contribution to International Water Cooperation (Leiden: Brill 2015) 533–539.
354   A. Rieu-Clarke and R. Kinna, ‘Can Two Global UN Water Conventions Effectively 
Co-exist? Making the Case for a “Package Approach” to Support Institutional Coordination’, 
23(1) Review of European Community & International Environmental Law (2014) 15–31.
355   Such thinking might be one of the reasons slowing down states joining the 
UN Watercourses Convention, see Rieu-Clarke & Loures, supra note 30.
356   H. Lauterpacht, ‘Codification and Development of International Law’, 49(1) American 
Journal of International Law (1955) 16–43.
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of a particular rule or principle might be reflective of customary international 
law or not. A similar argument might be made for the due diligence obligation 
to prevent significant harm. While states might accept that they have a due 
diligence obligation to prevent significant harm as a matter of customary inter-
national law, state perceptions on the ‘appropriate measures’ that they should 
put in place to satisfy such a due diligence requirement may differ markedly. 
The UNECE Water Convention offers greater clarity and certainty in this regard 
by setting out what the central ‘appropriate measures’ should be.
Secondly, it is important to bear in mind that the task of the ILC in develop-
ing the text of the UN Watercourses Convention was to codify and progressively 
develop law relating to international watercourses. While the UN Watercourses 
Convention might therefore be seen as generally reflective of customary inter-
national law, some rules and principles contained therein might rather be 
seen as reflective of existing customary international law (lex lata) rather than 
a progressive development (lex ferenda). The ILC does not explicitly state 
which provisions it considers as reflective of existing customary international 
law, and which it would consider as a progressive development. It is therefore 
up to states and other commentators to interpret which parts of a convention 
are reflective of customary international law and which are not. The UNECE 
Water Convention would also face the same challenges whereby some provi-
sions may be reflective of customary international law, and others not. States 
of the Mekong Basin might therefore gain greater clarity and certainty as to 
what rules and principles of law apply to their relations over international 
watercourse by joining both conventions.
In addition, the act of joining both conventions may contribute to the 
strengthening of customary international law relating to international 
watercourses.357 The ICJ, for example, has maintained that ‘a very widespread 
and representative participation in . . . [a] convention might suffice of itself, 
provided it included that of states whose interests were specially affected’, to 
create an obligation under customary international law that is biding upon all 
states, irrespective of whether they are party to convention in question or not.358 
The Lower Mekong Basin states becoming parties to the two global water con-
ventions could therefore play their part in helping to strengthen customary 
international law in relation to international watercourses. If other states were 
to follow their lead, and a widespread and representative body of states sharing 
watercourses across the world became parties to the two water conventions, 
357   H. Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014).
358   ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/ Denmark; Federal 
Republic of Germany/ Netherlands), Judgement, 20 February 1969, at 43.
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then the rules and principles contained in the conventions may become bind-
ing upon all states of the Mekong Basin, including China and Myanmar.359 
Whilst such a proposition, at first glance, might be considered a big leap given 
that China voted against the UN Watercourses Convention in 1997, a more 
nuanced analysis of China’s view on the convention offers encouragement. 
Firstly, China has entered into bilateral treaty arrangements with its neigh-
bours that largely reflects the key rules and principles contained in both the 
UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE Water Convention.360 Secondly, 
the reasons for China voting against the UN Watercourses Convention might 
be seen as reflective of state practice and opinio juris at the time of adoption 
of the Convention, and not current thinking. For example, Burundi voted 
against the UN Watercourses Convention in 1997, but its subsequent state 
practice, including signing the Nile Cooperative Framework Agreement 
and becoming party to the Convention on the Sustainable Management of 
Lake Tanganyika, would suggest that they are now willing to accept treaty 
commitments that go beyond what is contained in the two global frame-
work conventions.361 Evidence that state opinion on the UN Watercourses 
Convention has evolved can also be seen in the cases of Belgium, France, Spain 
and Uzbekistan; while these states abstained during the recorded vote that was 
taken in 1997 upon adoption of the UN Watercourses Convention, they have all 
subsequently become parties to the Convention.362
359   A. D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (New York: Cornell University 
Press 1971), see also, A. D. Amato, ‘The Concept of Special Custom in International Law’, 
63 American Journal of International Law (1969) 211–223.
360   C. Huiping, A.Rieu-Clarke & P. Wouters, ‘Exploring China’s Transboundary Water Treaty 
Practice Through the Prism of the UN Watercourses Convention’, 38 Water International 
(2013) 217–230; P. Wouters & C. Huiping, ‘China’s “Soft-path” to Transboundary Water 
Cooperation Examined in Light of Two UN Global Water Conventions: Exploring the 
“Chinese Way” ’, 22 Journal of Water Law (2011) 229–247; P. Wouters, ‘Enhancing China’s 
Transboundary Water Cooperation—What Role for the UNECE Water Convention?’, in 
A. Tanzi, et al.. (eds), The UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes: Its Contribution to International Water Cooperation 
(London: Brill 2015) 451–565.
361   Convention on the Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika (2003); Agreement on 
the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework (2011).
362   See recorded votes on adoption of the UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 27; and for 
a list of Parties to the Convention, see United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, Multilateral 
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-12&chapter=27&clang=_en (accessed 16 December 
2016).
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As it currently stands, the MRC is significantly weakened in its ability to 
effectively govern the Mekong River by the absence of China and Myanmar, 
which are not member states despite being invited to join.363 Although China’s, 
and to a lesser extent Myanmar’s, perpetual self-exclusion from member-
ship of the MRC via the Mekong Agreement appears to be logical given their 
respective locations in the upstream Mekong basin, it severely limits the MRC’s 
mandate to adopt a truly basin-wide approach to the effective equitable and 
reasonable utilisation of the entire flow of the Mekong River.364 Indeed, on this 
point it is worth noting that, ‘[a]pproximately 21 per cent of the length of the 
Mekong river mainstream is within Chinese territory, with this area contribut-
ing 16 per cent of the overall discharge of the river.’365 Recent positive steps 
towards greater cooperation with China include the First Lancang-Mekong 
Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting, which brought together the six countries of 
the Mekong.366 Commentators have also pointed to Chinese willingness to 
release water from its upstream reservoirs in April 2016 to relieve the water 
shortages of downstream countries, as a sign of positive cooperation amongst 
upstream and downstream states.367 However, others have claimed that 
the upstream storage is at the root cause of downstream water shortages and 
that such releases are actually part of normal seasonal plans, rather than altru-
istic acts of hydro-diplomacy by China.368 While significant challenges in 
reconciling competing upstream and downstream interests over the Mekong 
might remain, the significance of the growing momentum in support of the 
two global water conventions should not be underestimated.369 Increased 
363   Bearden, supra note 135, at 811; Van Duyen, supra note 117, at 365.
364   Bearden, supra note 135, at 811; Van Duyen, supra note 117, at 365.
365   Van Duyen, supra note 117, at 365.
366   MRC, ‘Lancang-Mekong Cooperation: MRC welcomes the New Initiative for Regional 
Cooperation by Six Countries in the Mekong Region’, 31 March 2016, http://www.mrcmekong 
.org/news-and-events/news/lancang-mekong-cooperation-mrc-welcomes-the-new- 
initiative-for-regional-cooperation-by-six-countries-in-the-mekong-river-basin (accessed 
28 November 2016).
367   M. Zhou, ‘China and the Mekong Delta: Water Savior or Water Tyrant’, 23 March 2016, The 
Diplomat,  http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/china-and-the-mekong-delta-water-savior-
or-water-tyrant (accessed 28 November 2016).
368   Ibid.
369   It could be argued that entry into force of the UN Watercourses Convention has already 
heightened the instrument’s influence on negotiations between states over international 
watercourses, see for example, Z. Yihdego and A. Rieu-Clarke, ‘An Exploration of Fairness 
in International Law Through the Blue Nile and GERD’, 41 Water International (2016) 
528–529.
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formal endorsement of these two conventions by a wider constituency of 
states will no doubt enhance their value as a platform by which to negotiate 
cooperative arrangements between state parties and non-state parties; a plat-
form that is premised on the need to ensure that international watercourses 
are governed in an equitable and sustainable manner.
IV Additional Benefits for Mekong States in Joining the Two Global 
Water Conventions
As an adjunct objective of joining the two global water conventions, there 
should also be a parallel focus on strengthening applicable domestic laws to 
align with the provisions of the UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE 
Water Convention. Irrespective of how long national accession processes may 
take, the lower Mekong Basin states could begin actions to strengthen their 
domestic legislation with the aim of facilitating changes in national legislation 
that align with the principles and provisions of the two global water conven-
tions. Moreover, joining the conventions could provide the necessary impetus 
and vehicle for each of the MRC member countries that have not already done 
so ‘to enact specific legislation to adopt the Mekong Agreement, and to spell 
out the ways in which the Agreement would be consistently adopted in the 
particular jurisdiction.’370 This potentially pivotal role of the two water con-
ventions in providing a basis for parties to the Mekong Agreement seeking to 
update and align existing domestic water-related laws is best summed up by 
Pech in contending that:
While environmental problems may be evident, a Government or 
Parliament may be reluctant to develop the necessary laws and insti-
tutions to address the problems [. . .] The state might not want to put 
domestic businesses at a competitive disadvantage. In this context, the 
multilateral agreement can elevate the international importance of a 
particular environmental problem, providing additional political moti-
vation domestically (as well as internationally) to address the problem. 
The specific provisions of the 1997 UNWC can provide a common, basic 
framework for the state to follow in developing measures to address the 
problem. Such a common framework could help to ameliorate concerns 
of competitive disadvantage, and thereby facilitate domestic legislative 
development.371
370   Hirsch, et al., supra note 5, at 13.
371   Pech, supra note 330, at 72–73; See also R.A.R. Oliver, P. Moore & K. Lazarus, Mekong 
Region Water Resources Decision-making: National Policy and Legal Frameworks vis-à-vis 
World Commission on Dams Strategic Priorities (Bangkok: IUCN 2016).
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Additionally, through the domestic process towards accession, acceptance, 
approval or ratification governmental departments will be required to col-
laborate across sectors to consider the implications of the UN Watercourses 
Convention on, for example, foreign investment law, environmental protection 
or human rights. Such collaboration may have benefits in fostering a better 
understanding of how to integrate legal issues pertaining to transboundary 
water into traditional sectors.372
There is also a need to analyse and identify the potential economic ben-
efits to be achieved by MRC member states joining and implementing the two 
global water conventions. There are potential economic incentives to clarifying 
pathways, standards and expectations for cooperation, specifically in relation 
to the procedures for prior notification and consultation regarding planned 
measures such as hydropower projects with possible transboundary impacts. 
One instance where this benefit may have directly applied is in relation to the 
PNCPA process under the Mekong Agreement as applied to the Xayaburi Dam 
development in Laos. Both the MRC itself and the individual member states 
involved in this process could have benefited from having clearly defined and 
legally binding methods and timeframes. In relation to the PNCPA process 
under the Mekong Agreement as applied to the Xayaburi Dam, there were 
distinct ‘political costs that a lack of clarity brings for all states concerned.’373 
Fragmented approaches to data and information-gathering may lead to addi-
tional costs for all interested parties, as each party seeks to unilaterally ascer-
tain the potential risks and benefits associated with the project. Additionally, 
while Lao’s decision to re-design the project to partially satisfy the concerns 
of the other lower Mekong states might be seen as a positive outcome of the 
Xayaburi PNPCA process, it could be argued that incorporating such concerns 
and changes into an early stage of the planning process would have been less 
costly.374
As the pace of dam construction rapidly accelerates and as the region’s 
economies develop, it has become clear that the legal obligations of the 
Mekong Agreement and PNPCA need significant clarifying and strengthen-
ing to evolve and cope with these trends. An important turning point seems 
to be that the MRC and its member states finally appear to recognise this as 
a crucial priority. A workshop entitled ‘Dialogue of Lessons Learnt from the 
Implementation of the PNPCA and Guidelines’ was convened in February 2016 
372   A. Rieu-Clarke, ‘Transboundary Hydropower Projects Seen Through the Lens of Three 
International Legal Regimes—Foreign Investment, Environmental Protection and 
Human Rights’, 3(1) International Journal of Water Governance (2015) 1–24.
373   Rieu-Clarke, supra note 334, at 29.
374   Rieu-Clarke, supra note 334, at 29.
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by the MRC. Its stated aim was to draw lessons from states’ PNPCA experiences 
of both the Xayaburi and Don Sahong dams in order to improve the proce-
dures and guidelines.375 One workshop thematic session (facilitated by one of 
the authors of this monograph) specifically investigated how guidance from the 
global water conventions and applicable international case law might sup-
port implementing legal ‘best practice’ standards for notification and prior 
consultation procedures within the PNPCA and Guidelines.376 One of the 
major recommendations to emerge from this workshop was for the MRC to 
develop a commentary on international best practice in transboundary water 
governance agreements related to the PNCPA under the Mekong Agreement. 
In any interpretation of such a commentary, both global water conventions 
would form the basis and primary benchmarks for subsequent recommenda-
tions in relation to globally accepted standards for legal principles and pro-
cesses for governing international rivers and how these relate to strengthening 
the PNPCA.
An additional benefit of membership of the UNECE Water Convention 
relates to the institutional framework that supports its implementation. 
Through the Meeting of the Parties, secretariat and various working groups, 
Mekong Basin states have opportunities to share their experiences with other 
basins across the world, which will differ in contexts but often face similar 
challenges. A major impetus for the work carried out under the UNECE Water 
Convention is the tri-annual work programme that is agreed upon by the 
Member States at each Meeting of the Parties. The Work Programme for 2016–
2018 includes six programme areas: support for implementation and applica-
tion of the convention; identifying, assessing and communicating the benefits 
of transboundary water cooperation; the water-food-energy-ecosystems nexus 
in transboundary basins; adapting to climate change in transboundary basins; 
opening of the Convention, promotion and partnerships; and European Union 
Water Initiative and National Policy Dialogues.377 While all states are able to 
participate in these activities, irrespective of whether or not they are a party 
to the UNECE Water Convention, it might be argued that being a party shows 
a stronger commitment, and offers more opportunities for a state to influence 
the future direction of the work programme.
375   MRC, ‘MRC Discuss Lessons Learnt From its Procedure on Water Diplomacy’, 25 February 
2016, http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/events/mrc-discuss-lessons-learnt-
from-its-procedure-on-water-diplomacy (accessed 28 November 2016).
376   Ibid.
377   See UNECE, Report of the Meetings of the Parties on its Seventh Session, 7 July 2016, 
UN Doc. ECE/MP.WAT/49/Add.1.
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 Recommendations and Conclusions
This monograph has aimed to demonstrate that the Mekong Agreement 
should be strengthened through alignment with the two global water conven-
tions, much of which reflect customary international law. Through detailed 
comparative legal analyses of the Mekong Agreement and its accompany-
ing procedures and guidelines against the UN Watercourses Convention and 
the UNECE Water Convention, the recommendation for implementing this 
alignment is for Mekong states to become parties to one or both conventions. 
Attempting to renegotiate the Mekong Agreement’s existing provisions with 
the expectation of increased detail and rigour is unappealing because, based 
on the evolution of the Agreement, such an initiative would undoubtedly take 
a long time and require increased resources in order for the states to negotiate 
and agree upon a joint text. Such an exercise may ultimately fail. Alternatively, 
creating a supplementary protocol to the Mekong Agreement containing the 
UN Watercourses Convention’s and/or UNECE Water Convention’s provisions 
would not only diminish their legally binding force (as adjuncts to the Mekong 
Agreement, much like the non-legally binding PNPCA and its Guidelines) but 
could also take significant time and resources to negotiate, agree on and enter 
into force. Hence, it is clear that the two reform options above are resource 
intensive; they undermine the legally binding framework nature of both global 
water conventions; and do not guarantee an outcome.
With the recent momentum behind the UN Watercourses Convention, espe-
cially Vietnam’s accession leading to its entry into force, as well as the UNECE 
Water Convention’s recent opening to global accession, there is a real alter-
native option to the two above for possible parallel, mutually reinforcing and 
normative operation of the two global water conventions in the Mekong Basin. 
Based on the general legal compatibility and synergies between the three legal 
instruments across all of their main substantive and procedural provisions, 
there is a compelling case for all Mekong River Basin states to become a party 
(parties) to one or both of the two conventions. In effect, both conventions 
would concomitantly clarify and strengthen the provisions of the Mekong 
Agreement, not replace them. In-turn, the Agreement could be valued and uti-
lised for what it is: a broad statement of purpose for sustainable development 
within the Mekong region. Moreover, the MRC can then be effectively utilized 
within its true mandate as the crucial vehicle for cooperation, which brings the 
Mekong states to the negotiating table after decades of conflict and mistrust, 
rather than being the only dispute settlement body. Finally, based on the anal-
ysis detailed earlier, becoming party to one or both of the conventions would 
not present any significant additional burden on the MRC member states or 
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the other Mekong Basin states, given that they are already committed to imple-
ment the key rules and principles that are contained in both conventions.
The authors acknowledge that accession by MRC states to one or both 
of the two global water conventions will require further analysis of the legal 
interactions between the UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE Water 
Convention, the Mekong Agreement, and the Mekong Basin states. Further 
research on the legal process could go into more detailed analysis in relation 
to each country in the Mekong Basin becoming party to the UN Watercourses 
Convention and the UNECE Water Convention, and how this would inter-
act with national-level laws and other bi-lateral as well as multilateral laws. 
Moreover, scope for future legal analysis on the effectiveness of this proposed 
multi-layered—some would say hybrid—regional water governance legal 
regime could be supported by research such as that of Hirsch and Jensen, as 
well as Johns et al., on the intersection between law and politics, and how 
national interests and domestic laws can both shape and be shaped by interna-
tional legal instruments in the context of the Mekong Basin.378 Such research 
could thus help build awareness and, in turn, consensus amongst the Mekong 
Basin states towards pursuing the broader, general recommendation ‘that both 
the MRC and the national governments of member states initiate a process of 
moving from softer to harder law to support water governance in the Basin.’379
Now, more than 22 years after the Mekong Agreement was adopted by the 
lower Mekong Basin states of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, and fol-
lowing the accession to the UN Watercourses Convention by Vietnam, and the 
growing momentum behind the two global water conventions, there is cur-
rently an opportunity to seek a different approach for strengthening trans-
boundary water governance in the Mekong Basin. This monograph’s detailed 
comparative legal analysis reveals that if the two global instruments were 
collectively applied as a ‘package’ of legal norms and procedures to support 
existing provisions in the Mekong Agreement, many advantages could be 
achieved for improved transboundary water governance in the Mekong River 
Basin. While there is inherent flexibility contained within the two global water 
conventions, they would still strengthen the implementation and interpreta-
tion of the Agreement in a number of important areas, including the treatment 
378   Hirsch, P. & Jensen, K.M. (2006). National Interests and Transboundary Water Governance 
in the Mekong. Australian Mekong Resource Centre, University of Sydney, Australia; 
Johns, F., Saul, B., Hirsch, P., Stephens, T. & Boer, B. (2010). Law and the Mekong River 
Basin: A Social-Legal Research Agenda on the Role of Hard and Soft Law in Regulating 
Transboundary Water Resources Melbourne Journal of International Law 11(1), 154.
379   Ibid., at xvii.
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of groundwater, the ‘package’ of substantive norms, the level of detail per-
taining to legally binding procedural rules, and the step-wise and pragmatic 
approach to dispute settlement. Moreover, a concerted effort by the Mekong 
states to become parties to the global water conventions would also strengthen 
customary international law both generally and in the region, and provide a 
solid legal platform by which upstream and downstream states can negotiate 
more effectively than is currently the case. Ultimately, in implementing the 
UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE Water Convention, in parallel 
with the Mekong Agreement, riparian states would have a more comprehen-
sive and enforceable framework to meet the pressing challenges faced within 
the Mekong River Basin.
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